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Message-ID: <20190321030339.mr2jlxtyevfuegyf@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 20:03:40 -0700
From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
bpf@...r.kernel.org, Martin Lau <kafai@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/8] bpf: add helper to check for a valid SYN cookie
On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 02:09:08AM +0000, Lorenz Bauer wrote:
> On Tue, 19 Mar 2019 at 22:17, Alexei Starovoitov
> <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 10:20:59AM +0000, Lorenz Bauer wrote:
> > > Using bpf_skc_lookup_tcp it's possible to ascertain whether a packet
> > > belongs to a known connection. However, there is one corner case: no
> > > sockets are created if SYN cookies are active. This means that the final
> > > ACK in the 3WHS is misclassified.
> > >
> > > Using the helper, we can look up the listening socket via
> > > bpf_skc_lookup_tcp and then check whether a packet is a valid SYN
> > > cookie ACK.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>
> > > ---
> > > include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 18 +++++++++-
> > > net/core/filter.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > index 8e4f8276942a..587d7a3295bf 100644
> > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > @@ -2391,6 +2391,21 @@ union bpf_attr {
> > > * Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure.
> > > * For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock**
> > > * result is from **reuse->socks**\ [] using the hash of the tuple.
> > > + *
> > > + * int bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(struct bpf_sock *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len)
> > > + * Description
> > > + * Check whether iph and th contain a valid SYN cookie ACK for
> > > + * the listening socket in sk.
> > > + *
> > > + * iph points to the start of the IPv4 or IPv6 header, while
> > > + * iph_len contains sizeof(struct iphdr) or sizeof(struct ip6hdr).
> > > + *
> > > + * th points to the start of the TCP header, while th_len contains
> > > + * sizeof(struct tcphdr).
> > > + *
> > > + * Return
> > > + * 0 if iph and th are a valid SYN cookie ACK, or a negative error
> > > + * otherwise.
> > > */
> > > #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN) \
> > > FN(unspec), \
> > > @@ -2492,7 +2507,8 @@ union bpf_attr {
> > > FN(tcp_sock), \
> > > FN(skb_ecn_set_ce), \
> > > FN(get_listener_sock), \
> > > - FN(skc_lookup_tcp),
> > > + FN(skc_lookup_tcp), \
> > > + FN(tcp_check_syncookie),
> > >
> > > /* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper
> > > * function eBPF program intends to call
> > > diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
> > > index f5210773cfd8..45a46fbe4ee0 100644
> > > --- a/net/core/filter.c
> > > +++ b/net/core/filter.c
> > > @@ -5546,6 +5546,74 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skb_ecn_set_ce_proto = {
> > > .ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
> > > .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
> > > };
> > > +
> > > +BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_check_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph, u32, iph_len,
> > > + struct tcphdr *, th, u32, th_len)
> >
> > what was the reason to pass ip and tcp header pointers separately?
> > Why not to pass 'void* iph' with len long enough to cover both?
>
> Our use case is to look at Foo-over-UDP encapsulated packets before they are
> decapsulated, and if necessary forward them to another machine.
> Essentially a bit
> of BPF which either XDP_PASSes when we find that a packet belongs to a known
> connection, or XDP_TX if it doesn't.
>
> This means we already have to have both ip and tcp header parsed,
> otherwise it can't get a reference to a socket via bpf_skc_lookup_tcp.
> Giving both pointers
> to the syncookie helper saves us from doing that work twice.
>
> > the helper can compute tcp header and can take into account variable length ipv4 hdr
> > while checking that resulting ptr is within 'iph + len' validated by the verifier.
>
> I guess you're thinking of a use case where ip and tcp are not already
> parsed in eBPF, like checking
> tcp_check_syncookie(skb->sk, ...)?
>
> For IPv4 this seems straightforward, but for IPv6 I need to skip
> extension headers.
> ipv6_skip_exthdr requires an sk_buff, which isn't available when
> calling from an XDP context.
> Neither creating an sk_buff ad-hoc, nor duplicating ipv6_skip_exthdr
> are particularly appealing.
>
> Even if I have an skb context, I need to be able to specify at which offset in
> the skb the TCP/IP header starts, since we're using FoU encapsulation.
> In this case I also can't
> use skb->sk, but have to do skc_lookup_tcp, which requires demuxing
> again (to get a socket tuple).
> If the helper only takes a single pointer + length, that work is done twice.
>
> I think there is a tension here between integrating well with
> bpf_sock_tuple based APIs and
> using skb->sk directly. My best attempt at fixing this is
>
> bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(struct sock * sk, void *tcpiph,
> u32 tcpiph_len, u32 th_off, u64 flags)
>
> Where th_off is < tcpiph_len and gives the offset of the tcp header in tcpiph.
> But using that API seems even more cumbersome? It still requires demux in eBPF
> and figuring out th_off isn't very natural. It might be possible to
> allow th_off to be
> 0 to invoke ipv6_skip_exthdr machinery if there is a way around sk_buff.
>
> Alternatively:
>
> bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(void *ctx, u32 iph_offset, struct sock * sk, u64 flags)
>
> No idea whether this is feasible from XDP (due to sk_buff), and forces
> duplicate work.
> It would allow bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(skb, 0, NULL, 0) for checking skb
> against it skb->skb, which seems nice, but I'm not sure whether it's
> actually useful.
>
> > Last patch example is buggy in that sense, since it's doing:
> > tcph = data + sizeof(struct ethhdr) + sizeof(struct iphdr);
>
> Oops!
>
> >
> > If we drop two args then there will be room for 'flags'.
> > It can be used for example to indicate whether LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED
> > should be incremented or not.
> > May be it shold be unconditionally?
>
> No, I think that is only the right thing to do do if a) the packet is
> destined for the local machine
> and b) is dropped by BPF as a result of doing the check (otherwise
> we'd double count).
>
> For us, a) isn't necessarily true. For others, knowing to drop in case
> b) to avoid double counting
> seems harder than just letting the packet continue up the stack? I
> guess I'm not exactly clear what
> the use case could be.
>
> I agree that having flags would be good though.
Ok. All makes sense.
Was thinking that something like this should be possible:
BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_check_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph,
struct tcphdr *, th, u32, th_len, u64, flags)
and the helper would need to check that th - iph > sizeof(iphdr)
but that requires some non-trivial verifier hacks.
So please resubmit as-is.
It doesn't apply cleanly yet.
> > > +#if IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_IPV6)
> > > + case AF_INET6:
> > > + if (unlikely(iph_len < sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > + ret = __cookie_v6_check((struct ipv6hdr *)iph, th, cookie);
> >
> > I guess this is fast path and you don't want indirect call via ipv6_bpf_stub ?
> >
>
> We run this on all inbound eyeball traffic, so yes. What is the
> benefit of going via ipv6_bpf_stub?
to keep this helper working when ipv6 is a module,
but I very much prefer to kill ipv6-as-module option,
so IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_IPV6) is fine to me.
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