netdev - Re: [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down

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Date:   Wed, 27 Mar 2019 05:57:07 +1100 (AEDT)
From:   James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
cc:     Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@...gle.com>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@...e.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when
 the kernel is locked down

On Mon, 25 Mar 2019, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

> A while back, I suggested an approach to actually make this stuff
> mergeable: submit a patch series that adds lockdown mode, enables it
> by command line option (and maybe sysctl) *only* and has either no
> effect or only a token effect.  Then we can add actual features to
> lockdown mode one at a time and review them separately.

This makes sense to me.

> 
> And I'm going to complain loudly unless two things change about this
> whole thing:
> 
> 1. Lockdown mode becomes three states, not a boolean.  The states are:
> no lockdown, best-effort-to-protect-kernel-integrity, and
> best-effort-to-protect-kernel-secrecy-and-integrity.  And this BPF
> mess illustrates why: most users will really strongly object to
> turning off BPF when they actually just want to protect kernel
> integrity.  And as far as I know, things like Secure Boot policy will
> mostly care about integrity, not secrecy, and tracing and such should
> work on a normal locked-down kernel.  So I think we need this knob.

Another approach would be to make this entirely policy based:

- Assign an ID to each lockdown point
- Implement a policy mechanism where each ID is mapped to 0 or 1
- Allow this policy to be specified statically or dynamically

So, 

	kernel_is_locked_down("ioperm")

becomes

	kernel_is_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_IOPERM)

and this function checks e.g.

	if (lockdown_polcy[id]) {
		fail or warn;
        }

Thoughts?


> 2. All the proponents of this series, and the documentation, needs to
> document that it's best effort.  There will always be security bugs,
> and there will always be things we miss.

Right.  Maintaining this feature will be an ongoing effort, and if its not 
actively maintained, it will bitrot and become useless.


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>