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Message-Id: <20190406163325.13125-1-chris@monsan.to>
Date:   Sat,  6 Apr 2019 12:33:25 -0400
From:   Christopher Monsanto <chris@...san.to>
To:     davem@...emloft.net
Cc:     netdev@...r.kernel.org, Christopher Monsanto <chris@...san.to>
Subject: [PATCH net-next] af_unix: preserve position of fd-associated bytes in stream

It is currently impossible for the reader of an AF_UNIX stream socket to
fully reconstruct the data sent in the presence of SCM_RIGHTS, without
reading byte-for-byte. This prevents efficiently proxying or providing a
high-level buffering interface to these sockets.

Unfortunately POSIX does not specify the behavior of SCM_RIGHTS beyond the
existence of the constant and in general the semantics of ancillary data
attached to streams isn't on the firmest ground. The following is how these
concepts work on every *nix I am aware of. An SCM_RIGHTS array of file
descriptors is uniquely associated with a single byte in the stream; this
byte can be identified by reading the stream one byte at a time. sendmsg()
associates the given fds with the first byte in the buffer provided. When
recvmsg() returns fds, we know that exactly one fd-associated byte appears
in the buffer; if necessary partial reads are employed to guarantee this
invariant.

The issue in question concerns recvmsg(). Linux allows the fd-associated
byte to appear anywhere within the buffer; the reader has no way of knowing
which one it is. Other *nix systems (at least macOS/Solaris/FreeBSD), make
recvmsg() symmetric with sendmsg() and guarantee that the fd-associated
byte is the first byte in the buffer. The first change of this patch has
Linux adopt the stronger semantics of its peers, which fixes the issue at
hand while also bringing us closer to standardizing SCM_RIGHTS.

The existing implementation enforces the one-fd-associated-byte constraint
with a partial read after any skb with attached fds. The second & third
changes remove this unnecessary constraint, allowing data from subsequent
skbs to be copied to the buffer, as long those skbs do not have fds
attached to them.

Signed-off-by: Christopher Monsanto <chris@...san.to>
---
 net/unix/af_unix.c | 9 +++------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index ddb838a1b74c..761837a7da65 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -2297,6 +2297,9 @@ static int unix_stream_read_generic(struct unix_stream_read_state *state,
 
 		unix_state_unlock(sk);
 
+		if (UNIXCB(skb).fp && copied > 0)
+			break;
+
 		if (check_creds) {
 			/* Never glue messages from different writers */
 			if (!unix_skb_scm_eq(skb, &scm))
@@ -2356,9 +2359,6 @@ static int unix_stream_read_generic(struct unix_stream_read_state *state,
 
 			skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
 			consume_skb(skb);
-
-			if (scm.fp)
-				break;
 		} else {
 			/* It is questionable, see note in unix_dgram_recvmsg.
 			 */
@@ -2367,9 +2367,6 @@ static int unix_stream_read_generic(struct unix_stream_read_state *state,
 
 			sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, chunk);
 
-			if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
-				break;
-
 			skip = 0;
 			last = skb;
 			last_len = skb->len;
-- 
2.17.1

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