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Message-Id: <1555053870-31588-1-git-send-email-92siuyang@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:24:30 +0800
From: Young Xiao <92siuyang@...il.com>
To: marcel@...tmann.org, johan.hedberg@...il.com, davem@...emloft.net,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, linux-bluetooth@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Young Xiao <YangX92@...mail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow
From: Young Xiao <YangX92@...mail.com>
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.
This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@...mail.com>
---
net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
index 9f85a19..2151913 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ static int do_hidp_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, void __user
sockfd_put(csock);
return err;
}
+ ca.name[sizeof(ca.name)-1] = 0;
err = hidp_connection_add(&ca, csock, isock);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))
--
1.9.1
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