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Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 19:56:39 +0900 From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp> To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, netdev@...r.kernel.org, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp> Subject: [PATCH 9/9] udpv6: Check address length before reading address family KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to udpv6_pre_connect() is shorter than sizeof("struct sockaddr"->sa_family) bytes. (This patch is bogus if it is guaranteed that udpv6_pre_connect() is always called after checking "struct sockaddr"->sa_family. In that case, we want a comment why we don't need to check valid address length here.) Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp> --- net/ipv6/udp.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c index d538fafaf4a9..2464fba569b4 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c @@ -1045,6 +1045,8 @@ static void udp_v6_flush_pending_frames(struct sock *sk) static int udpv6_pre_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) { + if (addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) + return -EINVAL; /* The following checks are replicated from __ip6_datagram_connect() * and intended to prevent BPF program called below from accessing * bytes that are out of the bound specified by user in addr_len. -- 2.16.5
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