[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <a4887243-9018-9926-0cbe-8c1ae3b7769e@iogearbox.net>
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 14:46:21 +0200
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
To: Young Xiao <92siuyang@...il.com>
Cc: davem@...emloft.net, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, eric.dumazet@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: compat: fix msg_controllen overflow in
scm_detach_fds_compat()
On 06/04/2019 02:31 PM, Young Xiao wrote:
> There is a missing check between kmsg->msg_controllen and cmlen,
> which can possibly lead to overflow.
>
> This bug is similar to vulnerability that was fixed in commit 6900317f5eff
> ("net, scm: fix PaX detected msg_controllen overflow in scm_detach_fds").
Back then I mentioned in commit 6900317f5eff:
In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an
issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same
should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries
as well.
Do you have an actual reproducer or is it based on code inspection?
> Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@...il.com>
> ---
> net/compat.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c
> index a031bd3..8e74dfb 100644
> --- a/net/compat.c
> +++ b/net/compat.c
> @@ -301,6 +301,8 @@ void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *kmsg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
> if (!err) {
> cmlen = CMSG_COMPAT_SPACE(i * sizeof(int));
> + if (kmsg->msg_controllen < cmlen)
> + cmlen = kmsg->msg_controllen;
> kmsg->msg_control += cmlen;
> kmsg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
> }
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists