Date:   Wed, 19 Jun 2019 15:20:32 -0700
From:   Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...ichev.me>
To:     Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>
Cc:     Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>,
        Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Martin Lau <kafai@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 1/9] bpf: implement getsockopt and setsockopt
 hooks

On 06/19, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 19, 2019 at 1:17 PM Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...ichev.me> wrote:
> >
> > On 06/19, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jun 19, 2019 at 10:00 AM Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Implement new BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT program type and
> > > > BPF_CGROUP_{G,S}ETSOCKOPT cgroup hooks.
> > > >
> > > > BPF_CGROUP_SETSOCKOPT get a read-only view of the setsockopt arguments.
> > > > BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT can modify the supplied buffer.
> > > > Both of them reuse existing PTR_TO_PACKET{,_END} infrastructure.
> > > >
> > > > The buffer memory is pre-allocated (because I don't think there is
> > > > a precedent for working with __user memory from bpf). This might be
> > > > slow to do for each {s,g}etsockopt call, that's why I've added
> > > > __cgroup_bpf_prog_array_is_empty that exits early if there is nothing
> > > > attached to a cgroup. Note, however, that there is a race between
> > > > __cgroup_bpf_prog_array_is_empty and BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY where cgroup
> > > > program layout might have changed; this should not be a problem
> > > > because in general there is a race between multiple calls to
> > > > {s,g}etsocktop and user adding/removing bpf progs from a cgroup.
> > > >
> > > > The return code of the BPF program is handled as follows:
> > > > * 0: EPERM
> > > > * 1: success, continue with next BPF program in the cgroup chain
> > > >
> > > > v7:
> > > > * return only 0 or 1 (Alexei Starovoitov)
> > > > * always run all progs (Alexei Starovoitov)
> > > > * use optval=0 as kernel bypass in setsockopt (Alexei Starovoitov)
> > > >   (decided to use optval=-1 instead, optval=0 might be a valid input)
> > > > * call getsockopt hook after kernel handlers (Alexei Starovoitov)
> > > >
> > > > v6:
> > > > * rework cgroup chaining; stop as soon as bpf program returns
> > > >   0 or 2; see patch with the documentation for the details
> > > > * drop Andrii's and Martin's Acked-by (not sure they are comfortable
> > > >   with the new state of things)
> > >
> > > I like the general approach, just overall unclear about seemingly
> > > artificial restrictions I mentioned below.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > v5:
> > > > * skip copy_to_user() and put_user() when ret == 0 (Martin Lau)
> > > >
> > > > v4:
> > > > * don't export bpf_sk_fullsock helper (Martin Lau)
> > > > * size != sizeof(__u64) for uapi pointers (Martin Lau)
> > > > * offsetof instead of bpf_ctx_range when checking ctx access (Martin Lau)
> > > >
> > > > v3:
> > > > * typos in BPF_PROG_CGROUP_SOCKOPT_RUN_ARRAY comments (Andrii Nakryiko)
> > > > * reverse christmas tree in BPF_PROG_CGROUP_SOCKOPT_RUN_ARRAY (Andrii
> > > >   Nakryiko)
> > > > * use __bpf_md_ptr instead of __u32 for optval{,_end} (Martin Lau)
> > > > * use BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF() for consistency (Martin Lau)
> > > > * new CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS macro to wrap repeated parts
> > > >
> > > > v2:
> > > > * moved bpf_sockopt_kern fields around to remove a hole (Martin Lau)
> > > > * aligned bpf_sockopt_kern->buf to 8 bytes (Martin Lau)
> > > > * bpf_prog_array_is_empty instead of bpf_prog_array_length (Martin Lau)
> > > > * added [0,2] return code check to verifier (Martin Lau)
> > > > * dropped unused buf[64] from the stack (Martin Lau)
> > > > * use PTR_TO_SOCKET for bpf_sockopt->sk (Martin Lau)
> > > > * dropped bpf_target_off from ctx rewrites (Martin Lau)
> > > > * use return code for kernel bypass (Martin Lau & Andrii Nakryiko)
> > > >
> > > > Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@...com>
> > > > Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>
> > > > ---
> > >
> > > <snip>
> > >
> > > >
> > > > +struct bpf_sockopt_kern {
> > > > +       struct sock     *sk;
> > > > +       u8              *optval;
> > > > +       u8              *optval_end;
> > > > +       s32             level;
> > > > +       s32             optname;
> > > > +       u32             optlen;
> > >
> > > Optlen is used below as signed integer, so switch it to s32?
> > Good catch, should be s32 here and below, thanks!
> >
> > > > +       s32             retval;
> > > > +
> > > > +       /* Small on-stack optval buffer to avoid small allocations.
> > > > +        */
> > > > +       u8 buf[64] __aligned(8);
> > > > +};
> > > > +
> > >
> > > <snip>
> > >
> > > >
> > > > +struct bpf_sockopt {
> > > > +       __bpf_md_ptr(struct bpf_sock *, sk);
> > > > +       __bpf_md_ptr(void *, optval);
> > > > +       __bpf_md_ptr(void *, optval_end);
> > > > +
> > > > +       __s32   level;
> > > > +       __s32   optname;
> > > > +       __u32   optlen;
> > >
> > > Same as above, we expect BPF program to be able to set it to -1, so __s32?
> > >
> > > > +       __s32   retval;
> > > > +};
> > > > +
> > > >  #endif /* _UAPI__LINUX_BPF_H__ */
> > > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
> > >
> > > <snip>
> > >
> > > > +
> > > > +       if (ctx.optlen == -1)
> > > > +               /* optlen set to -1, bypass kernel */
> > > > +               ret = 1;
> > > > +       else if (ctx.optlen == optlen)
> > > > +               /* optlen not changed, run kernel handler */
> > > > +               ret = 0;
> > > > +       else
> > > > +               /* any other value is rejected */
> > > > +               ret = -EFAULT;
> > >
> > > I'm consufed about this assymetry between getsockopt and setsockopt
> > > behavior. Why we are disallowing setsockopt from changing optlen (and
> > > value itself)? Is there any harm in allowing that? Imagining some use
> > > case that provides transparent "support" for some option, you'd need
> > > to be able to intercept and provide custom values both for setsockopt
> > > and getsockopt. So unless I'm missing some security implications, why
> > > not make both sides able to write?
> > Because kernel setsockopt handlers use get_user to read the data. We
> > can definitely allow changing optval+optlen, but we'd have to copy
> > that data back to userspace to let kernel handle it. I'm not sure how
> > userspace might feel about it. Can it be a buffer in the readonly
> > elf section?
> 
> Ah, ok, now I see why :) Yeah, I guess it can be in read-only section.
> Alright, I don't see an easy solution to that, I guess we can live
> with that for now.
> 
> >
> > > Similar will apply w.r.t. retval, why can't setsockopt return EINVAL
> > > to reject some options? This seems very useful and very similar to
> > > what sysctl BPF hooks do.
> > I was just being defensive because I'm not sure what's the use-case.
> > We can already return EPERM, why do we need to return a different
> > error code? Are we comfortable letting progs return arbitrary number?
> > Or you just want to allow a bunch of pre-defined error codes?
> >
> > I haven't seen the ability to return arbitrary error from the sysctl
> > hooks, but maybe I didn't look hard enough.
> 
> Yeah, seems like sysctl is only 0 or EPERM. I missed for a moment that
> there is return value from BPF program and retval from the context. I
> think it's good enough as is.
> 
> >
> > > > +
> > > > +out:
> > > > +       sockopt_free_buf(&ctx);
> > > > +       return ret;
> > > > +}
> > > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt);
> > > > +
> > > > +int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
> > > > +                                      int optname, char __user *optval,
> > > > +                                      int __user *optlen, int max_optlen,
> > > > +                                      int retval)
> > > > +{
> > >
> > > <snip>
> > >
> > > > +
> > > > +       if (ctx.optlen > max_optlen) {
> > > > +               ret = -EFAULT;
> > > > +               goto out;
> > > > +       }
> > > > +
> > > > +       /* BPF programs only allowed to set retval to 0, not some
> > > > +        * arbitrary value.
> > > > +        */
> > > > +       if (ctx.retval != 0 && ctx.retval != retval) {
> > >
> > > Lookin at manpage of getsockopt, seems like at least two error codes
> > > are relevant and generally useful for BPF program to be able to
> > > return: EINVAL and ENOPROTOOPT? Why we are disallowing anything but 0
> > > (or preserving original retval)?
> > I was thinking about simple use-case where it's either BPF that
> > handles the opt or the kernel. And then it's BFP returning success or
> > EPERM. I don't think I understand why BPF needs to be able to
> > return different error codes. We can certainly do that if you think
> > that it makes sense; alternatively, we can start with 0 or kernel retval
> > and relax the requirements if someone really needs that in the future.
> >
> > (I don't have a strong opinion here tbh).
> 
> As replied above, EPERM is probably good enough for practical
> purposes, I was being a bit pedantic :)
Sounds good! I was also debating whether to allow BPF programs
to set arbitrary retval, but didn't find any good example on
why we need it :-)

> > > > +               ret = -EFAULT;
> > > > +               goto out;
> > > > +       }
> > > > +
> > > > +       if (copy_to_user(optval, ctx.optval, ctx.optlen) ||
> > > > +           put_user(ctx.optlen, optlen)) {
> > > > +               ret = -EFAULT;
> > > > +               goto out;
> > > > +       }
> > > > +
> > > > +       ret = ctx.retval;
> > > > +
> > > > +out:
> > > > +       sockopt_free_buf(&ctx);
> > > > +       return ret;
> > > > +}
> > > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_getsockopt);
> > > > +
> > >
> > > <snip>

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