netdev - Re: [PATCH bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf

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Date:   Wed, 26 Jun 2019 14:45:12 +0100
From:   Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>
To:     Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>
Cc:     Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Kernel Team <kernel-team@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf

On Tue, 25 Jun 2019 at 19:23, Song Liu <songliubraving@...com> wrote:
>
> This patch introduce unprivileged BPF access. The access control is
> achieved via device /dev/bpf. Users with access to /dev/bpf are able
> to access BPF syscall.
>
> Two ioctl command are added to /dev/bpf:
>
> The first two commands get/put permission to access sys_bpf. This
> permission is noted by setting bit TASK_BPF_FLAG_PERMITTED of
> current->bpf_flags. This permission cannot be inherited via fork().

I know nothing about the scheduler, so pardon my ignorance. Does
TASK_BPF_FLAG_PERMITTED apply per user-space process, or per thread?

-- 
Lorenz Bauer  |  Systems Engineer
6th Floor, County Hall/The Riverside Building, SE1 7PB, UK

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