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Message-ID: <156165700815.32598.16215539389630396969.stgit@john-XPS-13-9370>
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 10:36:48 -0700
From: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
To: daniel@...earbox.io, jakub.kicinski@...ronome.com, ast@...nel.org
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, edumazet@...gle.com,
john.fastabend@...il.com, bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] bpf: tls,
implement unhash to avoid transition out of ESTABLISHED
It is possible (via shutdown()) for TCP socks to go through TCP_CLOSE
state via tcp_disconnect() without calling into close callback. This
would allow a kTLS enabled socket to exist outside of ESTABLISHED
state which is not supported.
Solve this the same way we solved the sock{map|hash} case by adding
an unhash hook to remove tear down the TLS state.
Tested with bpf and net selftests plus ran syzkaller reproducers
for below listed issues.
Fixes: d91c3e17f75f2 ("net/tls: Only attach to sockets in ESTABLISHED state")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+4207c7f3a443366d8aa2@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+06537213db7ba2745c4a@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
---
include/net/tls.h | 2 ++
net/tls/tls_main.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/tls.h b/include/net/tls.h
index 6fe1f5c96f4a..935d65606bb3 100644
--- a/include/net/tls.h
+++ b/include/net/tls.h
@@ -264,6 +264,8 @@ struct tls_context {
bool in_tcp_sendpages;
bool pending_open_record_frags;
+ struct proto *sk_proto;
+
int (*push_pending_record)(struct sock *sk, int flags);
void (*sk_write_space)(struct sock *sk);
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c
index 51cb19e24dd9..e1750634a53a 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
@@ -251,11 +251,16 @@ static void tls_write_space(struct sock *sk)
ctx->sk_write_space(sk);
}
-static void tls_ctx_free(struct tls_context *ctx)
+static void tls_ctx_free(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
{
+ struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
+
if (!ctx)
return;
+ sk->sk_prot = ctx->sk_proto;
+ icsk->icsk_ulp_data = NULL;
+
memzero_explicit(&ctx->crypto_send, sizeof(ctx->crypto_send));
memzero_explicit(&ctx->crypto_recv, sizeof(ctx->crypto_recv));
kfree(ctx);
@@ -287,23 +292,49 @@ static void tls_sk_proto_cleanup(struct sock *sk,
#endif
}
+static void tls_sk_proto_unhash(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ void (*sk_proto_unhash)(struct sock *sk);
+ long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, 0);
+
+ if (unlikely(!ctx)) {
+ if (sk->sk_prot->unhash)
+ sk->sk_prot->unhash(sk);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ sk->sk_prot = ctx->sk_proto;
+ sk_proto_unhash = ctx->unhash;
+ tls_sk_proto_cleanup(sk, ctx, timeo);
+ if (ctx->rx_conf == TLS_SW)
+ tls_sw_release_strp_rx(ctx);
+ tls_ctx_free(sk, ctx);
+ if (sk_proto_unhash)
+ sk_proto_unhash(sk);
+}
+
static void tls_sk_proto_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
{
struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, 0);
void (*sk_proto_close)(struct sock *sk, long timeout);
- bool free_ctx = false;
+
+ if (unlikely(!ctx)) {
+ if (sk->sk_prot->close)
+ sk->sk_prot->close(sk, timeout);
+ return;
+ }
lock_sock(sk);
+ sk->sk_prot = ctx->sk_proto;
sk_proto_close = ctx->sk_proto_close;
if (ctx->tx_conf == TLS_HW_RECORD && ctx->rx_conf == TLS_HW_RECORD)
goto skip_tx_cleanup;
- if (ctx->tx_conf == TLS_BASE && ctx->rx_conf == TLS_BASE) {
- free_ctx = true;
+ if (ctx->tx_conf == TLS_BASE && ctx->rx_conf == TLS_BASE)
goto skip_tx_cleanup;
- }
tls_sk_proto_cleanup(sk, ctx, timeo);
@@ -311,11 +342,12 @@ static void tls_sk_proto_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
release_sock(sk);
if (ctx->rx_conf == TLS_SW)
tls_sw_release_strp_rx(ctx);
- sk_proto_close(sk, timeout);
if (ctx->tx_conf != TLS_HW && ctx->rx_conf != TLS_HW &&
ctx->tx_conf != TLS_HW_RECORD && ctx->rx_conf != TLS_HW_RECORD)
- tls_ctx_free(ctx);
+ tls_ctx_free(sk, ctx);
+ if (sk_proto_close)
+ sk_proto_close(sk, timeout);
}
static int do_tls_getsockopt_tx(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
@@ -733,16 +765,19 @@ static void build_protos(struct proto prot[TLS_NUM_CONFIG][TLS_NUM_CONFIG],
prot[TLS_SW][TLS_BASE] = prot[TLS_BASE][TLS_BASE];
prot[TLS_SW][TLS_BASE].sendmsg = tls_sw_sendmsg;
prot[TLS_SW][TLS_BASE].sendpage = tls_sw_sendpage;
+ prot[TLS_SW][TLS_BASE].unhash = tls_sk_proto_unhash;
prot[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW] = prot[TLS_BASE][TLS_BASE];
prot[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW].recvmsg = tls_sw_recvmsg;
prot[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW].stream_memory_read = tls_sw_stream_read;
prot[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW].close = tls_sk_proto_close;
+ prot[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW].unhash = tls_sk_proto_unhash;
prot[TLS_SW][TLS_SW] = prot[TLS_SW][TLS_BASE];
prot[TLS_SW][TLS_SW].recvmsg = tls_sw_recvmsg;
prot[TLS_SW][TLS_SW].stream_memory_read = tls_sw_stream_read;
prot[TLS_SW][TLS_SW].close = tls_sk_proto_close;
+ prot[TLS_SW][TLS_SW].unhash = tls_sk_proto_unhash;
#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
prot[TLS_HW][TLS_BASE] = prot[TLS_BASE][TLS_BASE];
@@ -793,6 +828,7 @@ static int tls_init(struct sock *sk)
tls_build_proto(sk);
ctx->tx_conf = TLS_BASE;
ctx->rx_conf = TLS_BASE;
+ ctx->sk_proto = sk->sk_prot;
update_sk_prot(sk, ctx);
out:
return rc;
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