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Message-ID: <20190724112235.GA7212@hmswarspite.think-freely.org>
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 07:22:35 -0400
From: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
To: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
Cc: network dev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org,
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>,
davem <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 1/4] sctp: check addr_size with sa_family_t size
in __sctp_setsockopt_connectx
On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 03:21:12PM +0800, Xin Long wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 11:25 PM Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 01:37:57AM +0800, Xin Long wrote:
> > > Now __sctp_connect() is called by __sctp_setsockopt_connectx() and
> > > sctp_inet_connect(), the latter has done addr_size check with size
> > > of sa_family_t.
> > >
> > > In the next patch to clean up __sctp_connect(), we will remove
> > > addr_size check with size of sa_family_t from __sctp_connect()
> > > for the 1st address.
> > >
> > > So before doing that, __sctp_setsockopt_connectx() should do
> > > this check first, as sctp_inet_connect() does.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
> > > ---
> > > net/sctp/socket.c | 2 +-
> > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
> > > index aa80cda..5f92e4a 100644
> > > --- a/net/sctp/socket.c
> > > +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
> > > @@ -1311,7 +1311,7 @@ static int __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(struct sock *sk,
> > > pr_debug("%s: sk:%p addrs:%p addrs_size:%d\n",
> > > __func__, sk, addrs, addrs_size);
> > >
> > > - if (unlikely(addrs_size <= 0))
> > > + if (unlikely(addrs_size < sizeof(sa_family_t)))
> > I don't think this is what you want to check for here. sa_family_t is
> > an unsigned short, and addrs_size is the number of bytes in the addrs
> > array. The addrs array should be at least the size of one struct
> > sockaddr (16 bytes iirc), and, if larger, should be a multiple of
> > sizeof(struct sockaddr)
> sizeof(struct sockaddr) is not the right value to check either.
>
> The proper check will be done later in __sctp_connect():
>
> af = sctp_get_af_specific(daddr->sa.sa_family);
> if (!af || af->sockaddr_len > addrs_size)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> So the check 'addrs_size < sizeof(sa_family_t)' in this patch is
> just to make sure daddr->sa.sa_family is accessible. the same
> check is also done in sctp_inet_connect().
>
That doesn't make much sense, if the proper check is done in __sctp_connect with
the size of the families sockaddr_len, then we don't need this check at all, we
can just let memdup_user take the fault on copy_to_user and return -EFAULT. If
we get that from memdup_user, we know its not accessible, and can bail out.
About the only thing we need to check for here is that addr_len isn't some
absurdly high value (i.e. a negative value), so that we avoid trying to kmalloc
upwards of 2G in memdup_user. Your change does that just fine, but its no
better or worse than checking for <=0
Neil
> >
> > Neil
> >
> > > return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > > kaddrs = memdup_user(addrs, addrs_size);
> > > --
> > > 2.1.0
> > >
> > >
>
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