netdev - Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf

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Date:   Thu, 15 Aug 2019 16:08:10 -0700
From:   Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc:     Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>,
        Daniel Colascione <dancol@...gle.com>,
        Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Kernel Team <Kernel-team@...com>,
        Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf

On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 11:36:43AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 10:29 AM Alexei Starovoitov
> <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 11:24:54AM +0000, Jordan Glover wrote:
> > > systemd --user processes aren't "less privileged". The are COMPLETELY unprivileged.
> > > Granting them cap_bpf is the same as granting it to every other unprivileged user
> > > process. Also unprivileged user process can start systemd --user process with any
> > > command they like.
> >
> > systemd itself is trusted. It's the same binary whether it runs as pid=1
> > or as pid=123. One of the use cases is to make IPAddressDeny= work with --user.
> > Subset of that feature already works with AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN.
> > CAP_BPF is a natural step in the same direction.
> >
> 
> I have the feeling that we're somehow speaking different languages.
> What, precisely, do you mean when you say "systemd itself is trusted"?
>  Do you mean "the administrator trusts that the /lib/systemd/systemd
> binary is not malicious"?  Do you mean "the administrator trusts that
> the running systemd process is not malicious"?

please see
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/4c1567f29aeb60a6741874bca8a8e3a0bd69ed01
I'm not advocating for or against this approach.
Call it 'security hole' or 'better security'.
There are two categories of people for any feature like this.
My point that there is a demand to use bpf for non-root and CAP_NET_ADMIN
level of privileges is acceptable.
Another option is to relax all of bpf to CAP_NET_ADMIN instead of CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
But CAP_BPF is clearly better way.

> My suggestions upthread for incrementally making bpf() depend less on
> privilege would accomplish this goal.

As I pointed out countless times it would make the system overall _less_ secure.
One of the goals here is to do sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1 to
make it _more_ secure.