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Message-ID: <156647667024.11061.16703783428256799077.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2019 13:24:30 +0100
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, linux-afs@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net 9/9] rxrpc: Only call skb_cow_data() once per packet
Move the call of skb_cow_data() from rxkad into rxrpc_recvmsg_data() and do
it as soon as the packet is first seen. This means that we only call this
function once per packet, even for a jumbo packet with a bunch of
subpackets.
In rxkad, we then have to guess how large a scatter-gather table we need
for decryption, particularly in rxkad_verify_packet_2(). We do this either
by creating an sg table that should be large enough, or by looking at
nr_frags on the skb.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
---
net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 1 +
net/rxrpc/input.c | 1 +
net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c | 11 ++++++++++-
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 32 +++++++++-----------------------
4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
index d784d58e0a0d..a42d6b833675 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ struct rxrpc_skb_priv {
u8 rx_flags; /* Received packet flags */
#define RXRPC_SKB_INCL_LAST 0x01 /* - Includes last packet */
#define RXRPC_SKB_TX_BUFFER 0x02 /* - Is transmit buffer */
+#define RXRPC_SKB_NEEDS_COW 0x04 /* - Needs skb_cow_data() calling */
union {
int remain; /* amount of space remaining for next write */
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/input.c b/net/rxrpc/input.c
index 660b7eed39b7..4df39f391e9d 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/input.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/input.c
@@ -448,6 +448,7 @@ static void rxrpc_input_data(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
atomic_set(&sp->nr_ring_pins, 1);
+ sp->rx_flags |= RXRPC_SKB_NEEDS_COW;
if (call->state == RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST) {
unsigned long timo = READ_ONCE(call->next_req_timo);
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
index 82bb48d96526..ef50580b5295 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call,
size_t len, int flags, size_t *_offset)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;
- struct sk_buff *skb;
+ struct sk_buff *skb, *trailer;
rxrpc_serial_t serial;
rxrpc_seq_t hard_ack, top, seq;
size_t remain;
@@ -343,6 +343,15 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call,
rxrpc_see_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_seen);
sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
+ if (sp->rx_flags & RXRPC_SKB_NEEDS_COW) {
+ ret2 = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
+ if (ret2 < 0) {
+ ret = ret2;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sp->rx_flags &= ~RXRPC_SKB_NEEDS_COW;
+ }
+
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
serial = sp->hdr.serial;
serial += call->rxtx_annotations[ix] & RXRPC_RX_ANNO_SUBPACKET;
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
index ae8cd8926456..c60c520fde7c 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
@@ -187,10 +187,8 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_encrypt(const struct rxrpc_call *call,
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
struct scatterlist sg[16];
- struct sk_buff *trailer;
unsigned int len;
u16 check;
- int nsg;
int err;
sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
@@ -214,15 +212,14 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_encrypt(const struct rxrpc_call *call,
crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
/* we want to encrypt the skbuff in-place */
- nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
- err = -ENOMEM;
- if (nsg < 0 || nsg > 16)
+ err = -EMSGSIZE;
+ if (skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags > 16)
goto out;
len = data_size + call->conn->size_align - 1;
len &= ~(call->conn->size_align - 1);
- sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
+ sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg));
err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, len);
if (unlikely(err < 0))
goto out;
@@ -319,11 +316,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct rxkad_level1_hdr sechdr;
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
struct scatterlist sg[16];
- struct sk_buff *trailer;
bool aborted;
u32 data_size, buf;
u16 check;
- int nsg, ret;
+ int ret;
_enter("");
@@ -336,11 +332,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
/* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt
* directly into the target buffer.
*/
- nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
- if (nsg < 0 || nsg > 16)
- goto nomem;
-
- sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
+ sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg));
ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, 8);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
return ret;
@@ -388,10 +380,6 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (aborted)
rxrpc_send_abort_packet(call);
return -EPROTO;
-
-nomem:
- _leave(" = -ENOMEM");
- return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
@@ -406,7 +394,6 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct rxkad_level2_hdr sechdr;
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
struct scatterlist _sg[4], *sg;
- struct sk_buff *trailer;
bool aborted;
u32 data_size, buf;
u16 check;
@@ -423,12 +410,11 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
/* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt
* directly into the target buffer.
*/
- nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
- if (nsg < 0)
- goto nomem;
-
sg = _sg;
- if (unlikely(nsg > 4)) {
+ nsg = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
+ if (nsg <= 4) {
+ nsg = 4;
+ } else {
sg = kmalloc_array(nsg, sizeof(*sg), GFP_NOIO);
if (!sg)
goto nomem;
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