netdev - Re: [PATCH bpf-next] bpf, capabilities: introduce CAP

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Message-Id: <20190828123041.c0c90c15865897461ee819a2@kernel.org>
Date:   Wed, 28 Aug 2019 12:30:41 +0900
From:   Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
To:     Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-team <kernel-team@...com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next] bpf, capabilities: introduce CAP_BPF

On Tue, 27 Aug 2019 19:21:44 -0400
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org> wrote:


> > Here's my proposal for CAP_TRACING, documentation-style:
> > 
> > --- begin ---
> > 
> > CAP_TRACING enables a task to use various kernel features to trace
> > running user programs and the kernel itself.  CAP_TRACING also enables
> > a task to bypass some speculation attack countermeasures.  A task in
> > the init user namespace with CAP_TRACING will be able to tell exactly
> > what kernel code is executed and when, and will be able to read kernel
> > registers and kernel memory.  It will, similarly, be able to read the
> > state of other user tasks.
> > 
> > Specifically, CAP_TRACING allows the following operations.  It may
> > allow more operations in the future:
> > 
> >  - Full use of perf_event_open(), similarly to the effect of
> > kernel.perf_event_paranoid == -1.
> > 
> >  - Loading and attaching tracing BPF programs, including use of BPF
> > raw tracepoints.
> > 
> >  - Use of BPF stack maps.
> > 
> >  - Use of bpf_probe_read() and bpf_trace_printk().
> > 
> >  - Use of unsafe pointer-to-integer conversions in BPF.
> > 
> >  - Bypassing of BPF's speculation attack hardening measures and
> > constant blinding.  (Note: other mechanisms might also allow this.)
> > 
> > CAP_TRACING does not override normal permissions on sysfs or debugfs.
> > This means that, unless a new interface for programming kprobes and
> > such is added, it does not directly allow use of kprobes.
> 
> kprobes can be created in the tracefs filesystem (which is separate from
> debugfs, tracefs just gets automatically mounted
> in /sys/kernel/debug/tracing when debugfs is mounted) from the
> kprobe_events file. /sys/kernel/tracing is just the tracefs
> directory without debugfs, and was created specifically to allow
> tracing to be access without opening up the can of worms in debugfs.

I like the CAP_TRACING for tracefs. Can we make the tracefs itself
check the CAP_TRACING and call file_ops? or each tracefs file-ops
handlers must check it?

> Should we allow CAP_TRACING access to /proc/kallsyms? as it is helpful
> to convert perf and trace-cmd's function pointers into names. Once you
> allow tracing of the kernel, hiding /proc/kallsyms is pretty useless.

Also, there is a blacklist of kprobes under debugfs. If CAP_TRACING
introduced and it allows to access kallsyms, I would like to move the
blacklist under tracefs, or make an alias of blacklist entry on tracefs.

Thank you,

-- 
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>