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Message-ID: <20190828044903.nv3hvinkkolnnxtv@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 21:49:05 -0700
From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-team <kernel-team@...com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next] bpf, capabilities: introduce CAP_BPF
On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 07:00:40PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> Let me put this a bit differently. Part of the point is that
> CAP_TRACING should allow a user or program to trace without being able
> to corrupt the system. CAP_BPF as you’ve proposed it *can* likely
> crash the system.
Really? I'm still waiting for your example where bpf+kprobe crashes the system...
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