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Date:   Fri, 6 Sep 2019 16:24:35 +0100
From:   Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
To:     Carlos Neira <cneirabustos@...il.com>
Cc:     netdev@...r.kernel.org, yhs@...com, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
        brouer@...hat.com, bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v10 2/4] bpf: new helper to obtain namespace
 data from  current task New bpf helper bpf_get_current_pidns_info.

On Fri, Sep 06, 2019 at 11:09:50AM -0400, Carlos Neira wrote:

> +BPF_CALL_2(bpf_get_current_pidns_info, struct bpf_pidns_info *, pidns_info, u32,
> +	 size)
> +{
> +	const char *pidns_path = "/proc/self/ns/pid";

> +	fname = kmem_cache_alloc(names_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
> +	if (unlikely(!fname)) {
> +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto clear;
> +	}
> +	const size_t fnamesize = offsetof(struct filename, iname[1]);
> +	struct filename *tmp;
> +
> +	tmp = kmalloc(fnamesize, GFP_ATOMIC);
> +	if (unlikely(!tmp)) {
> +		__putname(fname);
> +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto clear;
> +	}
> +
> +	tmp->name = (char *)fname;
> +	fname = tmp;
> +	len = strlen(pidns_path) + 1;
> +	memcpy((char *)fname->name, pidns_path, len);
> +	fname->uptr = NULL;
> +	fname->aname = NULL;
> +	fname->refcnt = 1;
> +
> +	ret = filename_lookup(AT_FDCWD, fname, 0, &kp, NULL);
> +	if (ret)
> +		goto clear;

Where do I begin?
	* getname_kernel() is there for purpose
	* so's kern_path(), damnit
> +
> +	inode = d_backing_inode(kp.dentry);
> +	pidns_info->dev = (u32)inode->i_rdev;

	* ... and this is utter bollocks - userland doesn't
have to have procfs mounted anywhere; it doesn't have to
have it mounted on /proc; it can bloody well bind a symlink
to anywhere and anythin on top of /proc/self even if its
has procfs mounted there.

	This is fundamentally wrong; nothing in the kernel
(bpf very much included) has any business assuming anything
about what's mounted where.  And while we are at it,
how deep on kernel stack can that thing be called?
Because pathname resolution can bring all kinds of interesting
crap into the game - consider e.g. NFS4 referral traversal.
And it can occur - see above about the lack of warranties
that your pathwalk will go to procfs and will remain there.

NAKed-by: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>

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