netdev - [PATCH 1/1] xen-netfront: do not use ~0U as error return value for xennet_fill

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Date:   Mon, 30 Sep 2019 15:44:29 +0800
From:   Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@...cle.com>
To:     xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com, jgross@...e.com,
        sstabellini@...nel.org, davem@...emloft.net, joe.jin@...cle.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] xen-netfront: do not use ~0U as error return value for xennet_fill_frags()

xennet_fill_frags() uses ~0U as return value when the sk_buff is not able
to cache extra fragments. This is incorrect because the return type of
xennet_fill_frags() is RING_IDX and 0xffffffff is an expected value for
ring buffer index.

In the situation when the rsp_cons is approaching 0xffffffff, the return
value of xennet_fill_frags() may become 0xffffffff which xennet_poll() (the
caller) would regard as error. As a result, queue->rx.rsp_cons is set
incorrectly because it is updated only when there is error. If there is no
error, xennet_poll() would be responsible to update queue->rx.rsp_cons.
Finally, queue->rx.rsp_cons would point to the rx ring buffer entries whose
queue->rx_skbs[i] and queue->grant_rx_ref[i] are already cleared to NULL.
This leads to NULL pointer access in the next iteration to process rx ring
buffer entries.

The symptom is similar to the one fixed in
commit 00b368502d18 ("xen-netfront: do not assume sk_buff_head list is
empty in error handling").

This patch uses an extra argument to help return if there is error in
xennet_fill_frags().

Fixes: ad4f15dc2c70 ("xen/netfront: don't bug in case of too many frags")
Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@...cle.com>
---
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
index e14ec75..c2a1e09 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -889,11 +889,14 @@ static int xennet_set_skb_gso(struct sk_buff *skb,

 static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 				  struct sk_buff *skb,
-				  struct sk_buff_head *list)
+				  struct sk_buff_head *list,
+				  int *errno)
 {
 	RING_IDX cons = queue->rx.rsp_cons;
 	struct sk_buff *nskb;

+	*errno = 0;
+
 	while ((nskb = __skb_dequeue(list))) {
 		struct xen_netif_rx_response *rx =
 			RING_GET_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, ++cons);
@@ -908,6 +911,7 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 		if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) {
 			queue->rx.rsp_cons = ++cons + skb_queue_len(list);
 			kfree_skb(nskb);
+			*errno = -ENOENT;
 			return ~0U;
 		}

@@ -1009,6 +1013,8 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
 	i = queue->rx.rsp_cons;
 	work_done = 0;
 	while ((i != rp) && (work_done < budget)) {
+		int errno;
+
 		memcpy(rx, RING_GET_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, i), sizeof(*rx));
 		memset(extras, 0, sizeof(rinfo.extras));

@@ -1045,8 +1051,8 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
 		skb->data_len = rx->status;
 		skb->len += rx->status;

-		i = xennet_fill_frags(queue, skb, &tmpq);
-		if (unlikely(i == ~0U))
+		i = xennet_fill_frags(queue, skb, &tmpq, &errno);
+		if (unlikely(errno == -ENOENT))
 			goto err;

 		if (rx->flags & XEN_NETRXF_csum_blank)
-- 
2.7.4