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Message-Id: <20191009222113.43209-1-edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2019 15:21:13 -0700
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
To: "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@...ronome.com>,
syzbot <syzkaller@...glegroups.com>
Subject: [PATCH net] net: silence KCSAN warnings around sk_add_backlog() calls
sk_add_backlog() callers usually read sk->sk_rcvbuf without
owning the socket lock. This means sk_rcvbuf value can
be changed by other cpus, and KCSAN complains.
Add READ_ONCE() annotations to document the lockless nature
of these reads.
Note that writes over sk_rcvbuf should also use WRITE_ONCE(),
but this will be done in separate patches to ease stable
backports (if we decide this is relevant for stable trees).
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in tcp_add_backlog / tcp_recvmsg
write to 0xffff88812ab369f8 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1:
__sk_add_backlog include/net/sock.h:902 [inline]
sk_add_backlog include/net/sock.h:933 [inline]
tcp_add_backlog+0x45a/0xcc0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1737
tcp_v4_rcv+0x1aba/0x1bf0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1925
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x51/0x470 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:204
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x110/0x140 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:231
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:299 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x133/0x210 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:252
dst_input include/net/dst.h:442 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish+0x121/0x160 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:413
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:299 [inline]
ip_rcv+0x18f/0x1a0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:523
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xa7/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:5004
__netif_receive_skb+0x37/0xf0 net/core/dev.c:5118
netif_receive_skb_internal+0x59/0x190 net/core/dev.c:5208
napi_skb_finish net/core/dev.c:5671 [inline]
napi_gro_receive+0x28f/0x330 net/core/dev.c:5704
receive_buf+0x284/0x30b0 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1061
virtnet_receive drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1323 [inline]
virtnet_poll+0x436/0x7d0 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1428
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6352 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x3ae/0xa50 net/core/dev.c:6418
read to 0xffff88812ab369f8 of 8 bytes by task 7271 on cpu 0:
tcp_recvmsg+0x470/0x1a30 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2047
inet_recvmsg+0xbb/0x250 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:838
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:871 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:889 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x92/0xb0 net/socket.c:885
sock_read_iter+0x15f/0x1e0 net/socket.c:967
call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:1864 [inline]
new_sync_read+0x389/0x4f0 fs/read_write.c:414
__vfs_read+0xb1/0xc0 fs/read_write.c:427
vfs_read fs/read_write.c:461 [inline]
vfs_read+0x143/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:446
ksys_read+0xd5/0x1b0 fs/read_write.c:587
__do_sys_read fs/read_write.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_read fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
__x64_sys_read+0x4c/0x60 fs/read_write.c:595
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x2f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 7271 Comm: syz-fuzzer Not tainted 5.3.0+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@...glegroups.com>
---
net/core/sock.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 +-
net/llc/llc_conn.c | 2 +-
net/sctp/input.c | 4 ++--
net/tipc/socket.c | 6 +++---
net/x25/x25_dev.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 50647a10fdb7f050e963e2734f0d3555fa4bd7aa..1cf06934da50b98fccc849d396680cee46badb7d 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ int __sk_receive_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
rc = sk_backlog_rcv(sk, skb);
mutex_release(&sk->sk_lock.dep_map, 1, _RET_IP_);
- } else if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf)) {
+ } else if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf))) {
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
goto discard_and_relse;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index bf124b1742df864a3007d137ff31c8bfb2bee12a..492bf6a6b0237a677aae5d7ef365a5fc7356e238 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ int tcp_v4_early_demux(struct sk_buff *skb)
bool tcp_add_backlog(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- u32 limit = sk->sk_rcvbuf + sk->sk_sndbuf;
+ u32 limit = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf) + READ_ONCE(sk->sk_sndbuf);
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo;
const struct tcphdr *th;
struct tcphdr *thtail;
diff --git a/net/llc/llc_conn.c b/net/llc/llc_conn.c
index a79b739eb223668aa837ac08bbcebc0ae5750a0a..7b620acaca9ec194e03b590c21fb004401dbc7ce 100644
--- a/net/llc/llc_conn.c
+++ b/net/llc/llc_conn.c
@@ -813,7 +813,7 @@ void llc_conn_handler(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb)
else {
dprintk("%s: adding to backlog...\n", __func__);
llc_set_backlog_type(skb, LLC_PACKET);
- if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf))
+ if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf)))
goto drop_unlock;
}
out:
diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c
index 5a070fb5b278f031339c8a239406ee0e019ff943..a700660f64616857423de50c0b578ba0740d527c 100644
--- a/net/sctp/input.c
+++ b/net/sctp/input.c
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ int sctp_backlog_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
- if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf))
+ if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf)))
sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
else
backloged = 1;
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static int sctp_add_backlog(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct sctp_ep_common *rcvr = chunk->rcvr;
int ret;
- ret = sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf);
+ ret = sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf));
if (!ret) {
/* Hold the assoc/ep while hanging on the backlog queue.
* This way, we know structures we need will not disappear
diff --git a/net/tipc/socket.c b/net/tipc/socket.c
index 3b9f8cc328f5c3aa2f39b5a8267bd206e714835f..7c736cfec57f8428cdc16500fa70845716ed9fae 100644
--- a/net/tipc/socket.c
+++ b/net/tipc/socket.c
@@ -2119,13 +2119,13 @@ static unsigned int rcvbuf_limit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct tipc_msg *hdr = buf_msg(skb);
if (unlikely(msg_in_group(hdr)))
- return sk->sk_rcvbuf;
+ return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf);
if (unlikely(!msg_connected(hdr)))
- return sk->sk_rcvbuf << msg_importance(hdr);
+ return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf) << msg_importance(hdr);
if (likely(tsk->peer_caps & TIPC_BLOCK_FLOWCTL))
- return sk->sk_rcvbuf;
+ return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf);
return FLOWCTL_MSG_LIM;
}
diff --git a/net/x25/x25_dev.c b/net/x25/x25_dev.c
index 5c111bc3c8ea5a8c079cd0d83733e7b253d47158..00e782335cb0740daa172f0c1835bcc3285ba46b 100644
--- a/net/x25/x25_dev.c
+++ b/net/x25/x25_dev.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static int x25_receive_data(struct sk_buff *skb, struct x25_neigh *nb)
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
queued = x25_process_rx_frame(sk, skb);
} else {
- queued = !sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf);
+ queued = !sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf));
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
--
2.23.0.581.g78d2f28ef7-goog
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