netdev - Re: [PATCHv3 net-next 2/5] sctp: add pf_expose per netns and sock and asoc

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Date:   Fri, 25 Oct 2019 16:02:22 +0800
From:   Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
To:     Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>
Cc:     network dev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org,
        Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>,
        davem <davem@...emloft.net>,
        David Laight <david.laight@...lab.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 net-next 2/5] sctp: add pf_expose per netns and sock and asoc

On Fri, Oct 25, 2019 at 11:23 AM Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
<marcelo.leitner@...il.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Oct 14, 2019 at 02:14:45PM +0800, Xin Long wrote:
> > As said in rfc7829, section 3, point 12:
> >
> >   The SCTP stack SHOULD expose the PF state of its destination
> >   addresses to the ULP as well as provide the means to notify the
> >   ULP of state transitions of its destination addresses from
> >   active to PF, and vice versa.  However, it is recommended that
> >   an SCTP stack implementing SCTP-PF also allows for the ULP to be
> >   kept ignorant of the PF state of its destinations and the
> >   associated state transitions, thus allowing for retention of the
> >   simpler state transition model of [RFC4960] in the ULP.
> >
> > Not only does it allow to expose the PF state to ULP, but also
> > allow to ignore sctp-pf to ULP.
> >
> > So this patch is to add pf_expose per netns, sock and asoc. And in
> > sctp_assoc_control_transport(), ulp_notify will be set to false if
> > asoc->expose is not set.
> >
> > It also allows a user to change pf_expose per netns by sysctl, and
> > pf_expose per sock and asoc will be initialized with it.
>
> I also do see value on this sysctl. We currently have an
> implementation that sits in between the states that the RFC defines
> and this allows the system to remain using the original Linux
> behavior, while also forcing especially the disabled state. This can
> help on porting applications to Linux.
Agreed.

>
> >
> > Note that pf_expose also works for SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO sockopt,
> > to not allow a user to query the state of a sctp-pf peer address
> > when pf_expose is not enabled, as said in section 7.3.
> >
> > v1->v2:
> >   - Fix a build warning noticed by Nathan Chancellor.
> > v2->v3:
> >   - set pf_expose to UNUSED by default to keep compatible with old
> >     applications.
>
> Hmmm UNUSED can be quite confusing.
> What about "UNSET" instead? (though I'm not that happy with UNSET
> either, but couldn't come up with a better name)
> And make UNSET=0. (first on the enum)
>
> So we have it like:
> "If unset, the exposure is done as Linux used to do it, while setting
> it to 1 blocks it and 2, enables it, according to the RFC."
>
> Needs a new entry on Documentation/ip-sysctl.txt, btw. We have
> pf_enable in there.
will add it meanwhile. Thanks.

>
> ...
>
> > @@ -5521,8 +5522,16 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_peer_addr_info(struct sock *sk, int len,
> >
> >       transport = sctp_addr_id2transport(sk, &pinfo.spinfo_address,
> >                                          pinfo.spinfo_assoc_id);
> > -     if (!transport)
> > -             return -EINVAL;
> > +     if (!transport) {
> > +             retval = -EINVAL;
> > +             goto out;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     if (transport->state == SCTP_PF &&
> > +         transport->asoc->pf_expose == SCTP_PF_EXPOSE_DISABLE) {
> > +             retval = -EACCES;
> > +             goto out;
> > +     }
>
> As is on v3, this is NOT an UAPI violation. The user has to explicitly
> set the system or the socket into the disabled state in order to
> trigger this new check.
Agreed.

>
> >
> >       pinfo.spinfo_assoc_id = sctp_assoc2id(transport->asoc);
> >       pinfo.spinfo_state = transport->state;
> > diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > index 238cf17..5d1ad44 100644
> > --- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > +++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ static int rto_alpha_min = 0;
> >  static int rto_beta_min = 0;
> >  static int rto_alpha_max = 1000;
> >  static int rto_beta_max = 1000;
> > +static int pf_expose_max = SCTP_PF_EXPOSE_MAX;
> >
> >  static unsigned long max_autoclose_min = 0;
> >  static unsigned long max_autoclose_max =
> > @@ -318,6 +319,15 @@ static struct ctl_table sctp_net_table[] = {
> >               .mode           = 0644,
> >               .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec,
> >       },
> > +     {
> > +             .procname       = "pf_expose",
> > +             .data           = &init_net.sctp.pf_expose,
> > +             .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
> > +             .mode           = 0644,
> > +             .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> > +             .extra1         = SYSCTL_ZERO,
> > +             .extra2         = &pf_expose_max,
> > +     },
> >
> >       { /* sentinel */ }
> >  };
> > --
> > 2.1.0
> >