[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20191108093607.GO5671@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 10:36:07 +0100
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Cc: davem@...emloft.net, daniel@...earbox.net, x86@...nel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 bpf-next 02/18] bpf: Add bpf_arch_text_poke() helper
On Fri, Nov 08, 2019 at 10:11:56AM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 07, 2019 at 10:40:23PM -0800, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > Add bpf_arch_text_poke() helper that is used by BPF trampoline logic to patch
> > nops/calls in kernel text into calls into BPF trampoline and to patch
> > calls/nops inside BPF programs too.
>
> This thing assumes the text is unused, right? That isn't spelled out
> anywhere. The implementation is very much unsafe vs concurrent execution
> of the text.
Also, what NOP/CALL instructions will you be hijacking? If you're
planning on using the fentry nops, then what ensures this and ftrace
don't trample on one another? Similar for kprobes.
In general, what ensures every instruction only has a single modifier?
I'm very uncomfortable letting random bpf proglets poke around in the
kernel text.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists