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Date:   Fri, 15 Nov 2019 17:49:49 +0100
From:   Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
To:     Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
Cc:     ast@...nel.org, john.fastabend@...il.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH rfc bpf-next 8/8] bpf: constant map key tracking for prog
 array pokes

On 11/15/19 5:33 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 08:13:58AM +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>> On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 08:29:41PM -0800, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>> On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 02:04:02AM +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>>>> Add tracking of constant keys into tail call maps. The signature of
>>>> bpf_tail_call_proto is that arg1 is ctx, arg2 map pointer and arg3
>>>> is a index key. The direct call approach for tail calls can be enabled
>>>> if the verifier asserted that for all branches leading to the tail call
>>>> helper invocation, the map pointer and index key were both constant
>>>> and the same. Tracking of map pointers we already do from prior work
>>>> via c93552c443eb ("bpf: properly enforce index mask to prevent out-of-bounds
>>>> speculation") and 09772d92cd5a ("bpf: avoid retpoline for lookup/update/
>>>> delete calls on maps"). Given the tail call map index key is not on
>>>> stack but directly in the register, we can add similar tracking approach
>>>> and later in fixup_bpf_calls() add a poke descriptor to the progs poke_tab
>>>> with the relevant information for the JITing phase. We internally reuse
>>>> insn->imm for the rewritten BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL instruction in order
>>>> to point into the prog's poke_tab and keep insn->imm == 0 as indicator
>>>> that current indirect tail call emission must be used.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
>>>> ---
>>>>   include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |  1 +
>>>>   kernel/bpf/verifier.c        | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>>   2 files changed, 99 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
>>>> index cdd08bf0ec06..f494f0c9ac13 100644
>>>> --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
>>>> +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
>>>> @@ -301,6 +301,7 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
>>>>   			u32 map_off;		/* offset from value base address */
>>>>   		};
>>>>   	};
>>>> +	u64 key_state; /* constant key tracking for maps */
>>>
>>> may be map_key_state ?
>>> key_state is a bit ambiguous in the bpf_insn_aux_data.
>>
>> Could be, alternatively could also be idx_state or map_idx_state since
>> it's really just for u32 type key indices.
>>
>>>> +static int
>>>> +record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
>>>> +		int func_id, int insn_idx)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
>>>> +	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg;
>>>> +	struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, U32_MAX);
>>>> +	struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr;
>>>> +	u64 val;
>>>> +
>>>> +	if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
>>>> +		return 0;
>>>> +	if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) {
>>>> +		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
>>>> +		return -EINVAL;
>>>> +	}
>>>> +
>>>> +	reg = &regs[BPF_REG_3];
>>>> +	if (!register_is_const(reg) || !tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) {
>>>> +		bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
>>>> +		return 0;
>>>> +	}
>>>> +
>>>> +	val = reg->var_off.value;
>>>> +	if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux))
>>>> +		bpf_map_key_store(aux, val);
>>>> +	else if (bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val)
>>>> +		bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
>>>> +	return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>
>>> I think this analysis is very useful in other cases as well. Could you
>>> generalize it for array map lookups ? The key used in bpf_map_lookup_elem() for
>>> arrays is often constant. In such cases we can optimize array_map_gen_lookup()
>>> into absolute pointer. It will be possible to do
>>> if (idx < max_entries) ptr += idx * elem_size;
>>> during verification instead of runtime and the whole
>>> bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, &key); will become single instruction that
>>> assigns &array[idx] into R0.
>>
>> Was thinking exactly the same. ;-) I started coding this yesterday night [0],
>> but then had the (in hinsight obvious) realization that as-is the key_state
>> holds the address but not the index for plain array map lookup. Hence I'd need
>> to go a step further there to look at the const stack content. Will proceed on
>> this as a separate set on top.
>>
>>    [0] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dborkman/bpf.git/commit/?h=pr/bpf-tail-call-rebased2&id=b86b7eae4646d8233e3e9058e68fef27536bf0c4
> 
> yeah. good point. For map_lookup it's obvious that the verifier needs to
> compare both map ptr and *key, but that is the case for bpf_tail_call too, no?

It's covered in this patch, more below.

> It seems tracking 'key_state' only is not enough. Consider:
> if (..)
>    map = mapA;
> else
>    map = mapB;
> bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, 1);
> 
> May be to generalize the logic the verifier should remember bpf_reg_state
> instead of specific part of it like u32 ? The verifier keeps
> insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type; to prevent incorrect ctx access. That can
> also be generalized? Probably later, but conceptually it's the same category of
> tracking that the verifier needs to do.

In fixup_bpf_calls(), it checks for !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) &&
!bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux), so coming from different paths, this can
only be enabled if mapA == mapB in your above example.

For bpf_map_lookup and bpf_tail_call
> callsite it can remember bpf_reg_state of r1,r2,r3. The bpf_reg_state should be
> saved in insn_aux_data the first time the verifier goes through the callsite than
> everytime the verifier goes through the callsite again additional per-helper
> logic is invoked. Like for bpf_tail_call it will check:
> if (tnum_is_const(insn_aux_data[callsite]->r3_reg_state->var_off))
>    // good. may be can optimize later.
> and will use insn_aux_data[callsite]->r2_reg_state->map_ptr plus
> insn_aux_data[callsite]->r3_reg_state->var_off to compute bpf_prog's jited address
> inside that prog_array.

Yeah, that's what I'm doing for the tail call case.

> Similarly for bpf_map_lookup... r1_reg_state->map_ptr is the same map
> for saved insn_aux_data->r1_reg_state and for current->r1.
> The r2_reg_state should be PTR_TO_STACK and that stack value should be u32 const.
> Should be a bit more generic and extensible... instead of specific 'key_state' ?

Remembering all of the reg state could be an option to make it more generic
for the case of covering also plain array map lookup, though it might come with
more memory overhead than necessary. I'll experiment a bit with the various
options for improving that patch [0] from above.

Thanks,
Daniel

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