netdev - [PATCH 2/3] net: port < inet_prot_sock(net) --> inet_port_requires_bind

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Message-Id: <20191122072102.248636-2-zenczykowski@gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 21 Nov 2019 23:21:01 -0800
From:   Maciej Żenczykowski <zenczykowski@...il.com>
To:     Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@...gle.com>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc:     netdev@...r.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] net: port < inet_prot_sock(net) --> inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, port)

From: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@...gle.com>

Note that the sysctl write accessor functions guarantee that:
  net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock <= net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.range[0]
invariant is maintained, and as such the max() in selinux hooks is actually spurious.

ie. even though
  if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) || snum > high) {
per logic is the same as
  if ((snum < inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) && snum < low) || snum > high) {
it is actually functionally equivalent to:
  if (snum < low || snum > high) {
which is equivalent to:
  if (snum < inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) || snum < low || snum > high) {
even though the first clause is spurious.

But we want to hold on to it for the following patch.

Test: builds, git 'grep inet_prot_sock' finds no other references
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@...gle.com>
---
 include/net/ip.h               | 8 ++++----
 net/ipv4/af_inet.c             | 2 +-
 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c            | 2 +-
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 2 +-
 net/sctp/socket.c              | 4 ++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c       | 4 ++--
 6 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/ip.h b/include/net/ip.h
index cebf3e10def1..a92f157bb115 100644
--- a/include/net/ip.h
+++ b/include/net/ip.h
@@ -351,9 +351,9 @@ static inline bool sysctl_dev_name_is_allowed(const char *name)
 	return strcmp(name, "default") != 0  && strcmp(name, "all") != 0;
 }
 
-static inline int inet_prot_sock(struct net *net)
+static inline bool inet_port_requires_bind_service(struct net *net, int port)
 {
-	return net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock;
+	return port < net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock;
 }
 
 #else
@@ -362,9 +362,9 @@ static inline bool inet_is_local_reserved_port(struct net *net, int port)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static inline int inet_prot_sock(struct net *net)
+static inline bool inet_port_requires_bind_service(struct net *net, int port)
 {
-	return PROT_SOCK;
+	return port < PROT_SOCK;
 }
 #endif
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
index 53de8e00990e..2fe295432c24 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ int __inet_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len,
 
 	snum = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
 	err = -EACCES;
-	if (snum && snum < inet_prot_sock(net) &&
+	if (snum && inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, snum) &&
 	    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index ef37e0574f54..60e2ff91a5b3 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static int __inet6_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	snum = ntohs(addr->sin6_port);
-	if (snum && snum < inet_prot_sock(net) &&
+	if (snum && inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, snum) &&
 	    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
 		return -EACCES;
 
diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
index 3be7398901e0..8d14a1acbc37 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ ip_vs_service_find(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int af, __u32 fwmark, __u16 protocol
 
 	if (!svc && protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
 	    atomic_read(&ipvs->ftpsvc_counter) &&
-	    (vport == FTPDATA || ntohs(vport) >= inet_prot_sock(ipvs->net))) {
+	    (vport == FTPDATA || !inet_port_requires_bind_service(ipvs->net, ntohs(vport)))) {
 		/*
 		 * Check if ftp service entry exists, the packet
 		 * might belong to FTP data connections.
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 83e4ca1fabda..8797a38baf00 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static int sctp_do_bind(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr, int len)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (snum && snum < inet_prot_sock(net) &&
+	if (snum && inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, snum) &&
 	    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
 		return -EACCES;
 
@@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ static int sctp_connect_new_asoc(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 		if (sctp_autobind(sk))
 			return -EAGAIN;
 	} else {
-		if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < inet_prot_sock(net) &&
+		if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, ep->base.bind_addr.port) &&
 		    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
 			return -EACCES;
 	}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9625b99e677f..753b327f4806 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4623,8 +4623,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 
 			inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
 
-			if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) ||
-			    snum > high) {
+			if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
+			    snum < low || snum > high) {
 				err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
 						      snum, &sid);
 				if (err)
-- 
2.24.0.432.g9d3f5f5b63-goog