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Message-ID: <20191205180019.GA16185@linux.home>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 19:00:19 +0100
From: Guillaume Nault <gnault@...hat.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@...ronome.com>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net v2 2/2] tcp: tighten acceptance of ACKs not matching
a child socket
On Wed, Dec 04, 2019 at 07:08:49PM -0800, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>
>
> On 12/4/19 4:59 PM, Guillaume Nault wrote:
> > When no synflood occurs, the synflood timestamp isn't updated.
> > Therefore it can be so old that time_after32() can consider it to be
> > in the future.
> >
> > That's a problem for tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() as it may report
> > that a recent overflow occurred while, in fact, it's just that jiffies
> > has grown past 'last_overflow' + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID + 2^31.
> >
> > Spurious detection of recent overflows lead to extra syncookie
> > verification in cookie_v[46]_check(). At that point, the verification
> > should fail and the packet dropped. But we should have dropped the
> > packet earlier as we didn't even send a syncookie.
> >
> > Let's refine tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() to report a recent overflow
> > only if jiffies is within the
> > [last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval. This
> > way, no spurious recent overflow is reported when jiffies wraps and
> > 'last_overflow' becomes in the future from the point of view of
> > time_after32().
> >
> > However, if jiffies wraps and enters the
> > [last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval (with
> > 'last_overflow' being a stale synflood timestamp), then
> > tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() still erroneously reports an
> > overflow. In such cases, we have to rely on syncookie verification
> > to drop the packet. We unfortunately have no way to differentiate
> > between a fresh and a stale syncookie timestamp.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@...hat.com>
> > ---
> > include/net/tcp.h | 6 ++++--
> > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
> > index f0eae83ee555..005d4c691543 100644
> > --- a/include/net/tcp.h
> > +++ b/include/net/tcp.h
> > @@ -520,12 +520,14 @@ static inline bool tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(const struct sock *sk)
> > if (likely(reuse)) {
> > last_overflow = READ_ONCE(reuse->synq_overflow_ts);
> > return time_after32(now, last_overflow +
> > - TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID);
> > + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID) ||
> > + time_before32(now, last_overflow);
> > }
> > }
> >
> > last_overflow = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp;
> > - return time_after32(now, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID);
> > + return time_after32(now, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID) ||
> > + time_before32(now, last_overflow);
> > }
>
>
> There is a race I believe here.
>
> CPU1 CPU2
>
> now = jiffies.
> ...
> jiffies++
> ...
> SYN received, last_overflow is updated to the new jiffies.
>
>
> CPU1
> timer_before32(now, last_overflow) is true, because last_overflow was set to now+1
>
>
> I suggest some cushion here.
>
Yes, we should wrap access to ->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp into READ_ONCE(),
to ensure that last_overflow won't be reloaded between the
time_after32() and the time_before32() calls. Is that what you had in
mind?
- last_overflow = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp;
+ last_overflow = READ_ONCE(tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp);
Patch 1 would need the same fix BTW.
> Also we TCP uses between() macro, we might add a time_between32(a, b, c) macro
> to ease code review.
>
I didn't realise that. I'll define it in v3.
> ->
> return !time_between32(last_overflow - HZ, now, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID);
>
'last_overflow - HZ'? I don't get why we'd take HZ into account here.
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