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Message-Id: <20200315.170231.388798443331914470.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2020 17:02:31 -0700 (PDT)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: vincent@...nat.ch
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, kuba@...nel.org, edumazet@...gle.com,
kafai@...com, dsahern@...il.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH net-next v1] net: core: enable SO_BINDTODEVICE for
non-root users
From: Vincent Bernat <vincent@...nat.ch>
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2020 16:59:11 +0100
> Currently, SO_BINDTODEVICE requires CAP_NET_RAW. This change allows a
> non-root user to bind a socket to an interface if it is not already
> bound. This is useful to allow an application to bind itself to a
> specific VRF for outgoing or incoming connections. Currently, an
> application wanting to manage connections through several VRF need to
> be privileged. Moreover, I don't see a reason why an application
> couldn't restrict its own scope. Such a privilege is already possible
> with UDP through IP_UNICAST_IF.
It could be argued that IP_UNICAST_IF and similar should be privileged
as well.
When the administrator sets up the routes, they don't expect that
arbitrary user applications can "escape" the route configuration by
specifying the interface so readily.
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