netdev - Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Fri, 20 Mar 2020 16:35:47 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
Cc:     David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-afs@...ts.infradead.org, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
        Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@...hat.com>,
        Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
        Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key
 read

On Fri, Mar 20, 2020 at 09:27:03AM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> On 3/19/20 10:07 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 08:07:55PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> >> On 3/19/20 3:46 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 06:14:57PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> >>>> +			 * It is possible, though unlikely, that the key
> >>>> +			 * changes in between the up_read->down_read period.
> >>>> +			 * If the key becomes longer, we will have to
> >>>> +			 * allocate a larger buffer and redo the key read
> >>>> +			 * again.
> >>>> +			 */
> >>>> +			if (!tmpbuf || unlikely(ret > tmpbuflen)) {
> >>> Shouldn't you check that tmpbuflen stays below buflen (why else
> >>> you had made copy of buflen otherwise)?
> >> The check above this thunk:
> >>
> >> if ((ret > 0) && (ret <= buflen)) {
> >>
> >> will make sure that ret will not be larger than buflen. So tmpbuflen > >> will never be bigger than buflen.  > > Ah right, of course, thanks.
> >
> > What would go wrong if the condition was instead
> > ((ret > 0) && (ret <= tmpbuflen))?
> 
> That if statement is a check to see if the actual key length is longer
> than the user-supplied buffer (buflen). If that is the case, it will
> just return the expected length without storing anything into the user
> buffer. For the case that buflen >= ret > tmpbuflen, the revised check
> above will incorrectly skip the storing step causing the caller to
> incorrectly think the key is there in the buffer.
> 
> Maybe I should clarify that a bit more in the comment.

OK, right because it is possible in-between tmpbuflen could be
larger. Got it.

I think that longish key_data and key_data_len would be better
names than tmpbuf and tpmbuflen.

Also the comments are somewat overkill IMHO.

I'd replace them along the lines of

/* Cap the user supplied buffer length to PAGE_SIZE. */

/* Key data can change as we don not hold key->sem. */

/Jarkko