netdev - Re: [PATCH bpf-next 00/10] bpf

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Message-ID: <87imho3kiz.fsf@toke.dk>
Date:   Fri, 24 Apr 2020 18:39:48 +0200
From:   Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>
To:     Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>
Cc:     Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@...com>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Kernel Team <kernel-team@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 00/10] bpf_link observability APIs

Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com> writes:

> On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 4:40 AM Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com> wrote:
>>
>> Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@...com> writes:
>>
>> > This patch series adds various observability APIs to bpf_link:
>> >   - each bpf_link now gets ID, similar to bpf_map and bpf_prog, by which
>> >     user-space can iterate over all existing bpf_links and create limited FD
>> >     from ID;
>> >   - allows to get extra object information with bpf_link general and
>> >     type-specific information;
>> >   - implements `bpf link show` command which lists all active bpf_links in the
>> >     system;
>> >   - implements `bpf link pin` allowing to pin bpf_link by ID or from other
>> >     pinned path.
>> >
>> > rfc->v1:
>> >   - dropped read-only bpf_links (Alexei);
>>
>> Just to make sure I understand this right: With this change, the
>> GET_FD_BY_ID operation will always return a r/w bpf_link fd that can
>> subsequently be used to detach the link? And you're doing the 'access
>> limiting' by just requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the whole thing. Right? :)
>
> Right.

Great! SGTM; thanks for confirming :)

-Toke