netdev - [PATCH bpf-next v2 14/20] bpf: handle spilled PTR_TO_BTF_ID properly when checking stack

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Date:   Sun, 3 May 2020 23:26:03 -0700
From:   Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>
To:     Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@...com>, <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
CC:     Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, <kernel-team@...com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v2 14/20] bpf: handle spilled PTR_TO_BTF_ID properly when checking stack_boundary

This specifically to handle the case like below:
   // ptr below is a socket ptr identified by PTR_TO_BTF_ID
   u64 param[2] = { ptr, val };
   bpf_seq_printf(seq, fmt, sizeof(fmt), param, sizeof(param));

In this case, the 16 bytes stack for "param" contains:
   8 bytes for ptr with spilled PTR_TO_BTF_ID
   8 bytes for val as STACK_MISC

The current verifier will complain the ptr should not be visible
to the helper.
   ...
   16: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -64) = r2
   18: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -56) = r1
   19: (bf) r4 = r10
   ;
   20: (07) r4 += -64
   ; BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, fmt1, (long)s, s->sk_protocol);
   21: (bf) r1 = r6
   22: (18) r2 = 0xffffa8d00018605a
   24: (b4) w3 = 10
   25: (b4) w5 = 16
   26: (85) call bpf_seq_printf#125
    R0=inv(id=0) R1_w=ptr_seq_file(id=0,off=0,imm=0)
    R2_w=map_value(id=0,off=90,ks=4,vs=144,imm=0) R3_w=inv10
    R4_w=fp-64 R5_w=inv16 R6=ptr_seq_file(id=0,off=0,imm=0)
    R7=ptr_netlink_sock(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-56_w=mmmmmmmm
    fp-64_w=ptr_
   last_idx 26 first_idx 13
   regs=8 stack=0 before 25: (b4) w5 = 16
   regs=8 stack=0 before 24: (b4) w3 = 10
   invalid indirect read from stack off -64+0 size 16

Let us permit this if the program is a tracing/iter program.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 36b2a38a06fe..4884b6fd7bad 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3494,6 +3494,14 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 			*stype = STACK_MISC;
 			goto mark;
 		}
+
+		/* pointer value can be visible to tracing/iter program */
+		if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
+		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER &&
+		    state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
+		    state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
+			goto mark;
+
 		if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
 		    state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
-- 
2.24.1