netdev - Re: [PATCH] security: fix the default value of secid_to

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Date:   Wed, 13 May 2020 10:22:05 -0700
From:   Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To:     Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@...aro.org>,
        jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com
Cc:     Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security: fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook

James,

since you took the previous similar patch are you going to pick this
one up as well?
Or we can route it via bpf tree to Linus asap.

Thanks

On Tue, May 12, 2020 at 10:46 AM Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@...aro.org> wrote:
>
> security_secid_to_secctx is called by the bpf_lsm hook and a successful
> return value (i.e 0) implies that the parameter will be consumed by the
> LSM framework. The current behaviour return success when the pointer
> isn't initialized when CONFIG_BPF_LSM is enabled, with the default
> return from kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c.
>
> This is the internal error:
>
> [ 1229.341488][ T2659] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from null address (offset 0, size 280)!
> [ 1229.374977][ T2659] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [ 1229.376813][ T2659] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:99!
> [ 1229.378398][ T2659] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
> [ 1229.380348][ T2659] Modules linked in:
> [ 1229.381654][ T2659] CPU: 0 PID: 2659 Comm: systemd-journal Tainted: G    B   W         5.7.0-rc5-next-20200511-00019-g864e0c6319b8-dirty #13
> [ 1229.385429][ T2659] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
> [ 1229.387143][ T2659] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
> [ 1229.389165][ T2659] pc : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc
> [ 1229.390705][ T2659] lr : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc
> [ 1229.392225][ T2659] sp : ffff000064247450
> [ 1229.393533][ T2659] x29: ffff000064247460 x28: 0000000000000000
> [ 1229.395449][ T2659] x27: 0000000000000118 x26: 0000000000000000
> [ 1229.397384][ T2659] x25: ffffa000127049e0 x24: ffffa000127049e0
> [ 1229.399306][ T2659] x23: ffffa000127048e0 x22: ffffa000127048a0
> [ 1229.401241][ T2659] x21: ffffa00012704b80 x20: ffffa000127049e0
> [ 1229.403163][ T2659] x19: ffffa00012704820 x18: 0000000000000000
> [ 1229.405094][ T2659] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
> [ 1229.407008][ T2659] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 003d090000000000
> [ 1229.408942][ T2659] x13: ffff80000d5b25b2 x12: 1fffe0000d5b25b1
> [ 1229.410859][ T2659] x11: 1fffe0000d5b25b1 x10: ffff80000d5b25b1
> [ 1229.412791][ T2659] x9 : ffffa0001034bee0 x8 : ffff00006ad92d8f
> [ 1229.414707][ T2659] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffa00015eacb20
> [ 1229.416642][ T2659] x5 : ffff0000693c8040 x4 : 0000000000000000
> [ 1229.418558][ T2659] x3 : ffffa0001034befc x2 : d57a7483a01c6300
> [ 1229.420610][ T2659] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000059
> [ 1229.422526][ T2659] Call trace:
> [ 1229.423631][ T2659]  usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc
> [ 1229.425091][ T2659]  __check_object_size+0xdc/0x7d4
> [ 1229.426729][ T2659]  put_cmsg+0xa30/0xa90
> [ 1229.428132][ T2659]  unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x80c/0x930
> [ 1229.429731][ T2659]  sock_recvmsg+0x9c/0xc0
> [ 1229.431123][ T2659]  ____sys_recvmsg+0x1cc/0x5f8
> [ 1229.432663][ T2659]  ___sys_recvmsg+0x100/0x160
> [ 1229.434151][ T2659]  __sys_recvmsg+0x110/0x1a8
> [ 1229.435623][ T2659]  __arm64_sys_recvmsg+0x58/0x70
> [ 1229.437218][ T2659]  el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x29c/0x340
> [ 1229.438994][ T2659]  do_el0_svc+0xe8/0x108
> [ 1229.440587][ T2659]  el0_svc+0x74/0x88
> [ 1229.441917][ T2659]  el0_sync_handler+0xe4/0x8b4
> [ 1229.443464][ T2659]  el0_sync+0x17c/0x180
> [ 1229.444920][ T2659] Code: aa1703e2 aa1603e1 910a8260 97ecc860 (d4210000)
> [ 1229.447070][ T2659] ---[ end trace 400497d91baeaf51 ]---
> [ 1229.448791][ T2659] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
> [ 1229.450692][ T2659] Kernel Offset: disabled
> [ 1229.452061][ T2659] CPU features: 0x240002,20002004
> [ 1229.453647][ T2659] Memory Limit: none
> [ 1229.455015][ T2659] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---
>
> Rework the so the default return value is -EOPNOTSUPP.
>
> There are likely other callbacks such as security_inode_getsecctx() that
> may have the same problem, and that someone that understand the code
> better needs to audit them.
>
> Thank you Arnd for helping me figure out what went wrong.
>
> CC: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
> Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")
> Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@...aro.org>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index b9e73d736e13..31eb3381e54b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, getprocattr, struct task_struct *p, char *name,
>          char **value)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, setprocattr, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ismaclabel, const char *name)
> -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secid_to_secctx, u32 secid, char **secdata,
> +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid_to_secctx, u32 secid, char **secdata,
>          u32 *seclen)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secctx_to_secid, const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
>  LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, release_secctx, char *secdata, u32 seclen)
> --
> 2.20.1
>