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Message-Id: <20200514221142.11857-6-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 15:11:24 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@...el.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org
Cc: casey@...aufler-ca.com, keescook@...omium.org,
john.johansen@...onical.com, penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp,
paul@...l-moore.com, sds@...ho.nsa.gov, linux-audit@...hat.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v17 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Change the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a
secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the
security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the
lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code
that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx()
code is brought in line with the lsmblob.
The secid field of the unix_skb_parms structure has been
replaced with a pointer to an lsmblob structure, and the
lsmblob is allocated as needed. This is similar to how the
list of passed files is managed. While an lsmblob structure
will fit in the available space today, there is no guarantee
that the addition of other data to the unix_skb_parms or
support for additional security modules wouldn't exceed what
is available.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 ++++---
net/unix/scm.c | 6 ++++++
security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
7 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 453737cefe09..2715b8dd115e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1357,7 +1357,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1495,7 +1496,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
-static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index f42fdddecd41..e99c84677e14 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
kgid_t gid;
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- u32 secid; /* Security ID */
+ struct lsmblob *lsmdata; /* Security LSM data */
#endif
u32 consumed;
} __randomize_layout;
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 1ce365f4c256..e2e71c4bf9d0 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob; /* Passed LSM data */
#endif
};
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
- security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
+ security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->lsmblob);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
@@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
+ &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index aa3fd61818c4..6cf57d5ac899 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
- u32 seclen, secid;
+ u32 seclen;
int err;
- err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
+ err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 3385a7a0b231..a5c1a029095d 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -138,17 +138,18 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
+ UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata = kmemdup(&scm->lsmblob, sizeof(scm->lsmblob),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
}
static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
+ scm->lsmblob = *(UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
}
static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ return lsmblob_equal(&scm->lsmblob, UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
}
#else
static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/unix/scm.c b/net/unix/scm.c
index 8c40f2b32392..3094323935a4 100644
--- a/net/unix/scm.c
+++ b/net/unix/scm.c
@@ -142,6 +142,12 @@ void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid;
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+ if (UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata) {
+ kfree(UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
+ UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
/* Alas, it calls VFS */
/* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0a13e98ec6fc..fb003806807b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2159,10 +2159,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
optval, optlen, len);
}
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- skb, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
--
2.24.1
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