netdev - Re: [PATCH net-next] net/tls: fix race condition causing kernel panic

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Date:   Wed, 20 May 2020 12:58:44 -0700
From:   Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
To:     Vinay Kumar Yadav <vinay.yadav@...lsio.com>
Cc:     David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        secdev@...lsio.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next] net/tls: fix race condition causing kernel
 panic

On Wed, 20 May 2020 22:39:11 +0530 Vinay Kumar Yadav wrote:
> On 5/20/2020 12:46 AM, David Miller wrote:
> > From: Vinay Kumar Yadav <vinay.yadav@...lsio.com>
> > Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 13:13:27 +0530
> >  
> >> +		spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
> >> +		pending = atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
> >> +		spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);  
> > The sequence:
> >
> > 	lock();
> > 	x = p->y;
> > 	unlock();
> >
> > Does not fix anything, and is superfluous locking.
> >
> > The value of p->y can change right after the unlock() call, so you
> > aren't protecting the atomic'ness of the read and test sequence
> > because the test is outside of the lock.  
> 
> Here, by using lock I want to achieve atomicity of following statements.
> 
> pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
>        if (!pending && READ_ONCE(ctx->async_notify))
>             complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
> 
> means, don't want to read (atomic_read(&ctx->decrypt_pending))
> in middle of two statements
> 
> atomic_dec_return(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
> and
> complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
> 
> Why am I protecting only read, not test ?

Protecting code, not data, is rarely correct, though.

> complete() is called only if pending == 0
> if we read atomic_read(&ctx->decrypt_pending) = 0
> that means complete() is already called and its okay to
> initialize completion (reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion))
> 
> if we read atomic_read(&ctx->decrypt_pending) as non zero that means:
> 1- complete() is going to be called or
> 2- complete() already called (if we read atomic_read(&ctx->decrypt_pending) == 1, then complete() is called just after unlock())
> for both scenario its okay to go into wait (crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait))

First of all thanks for the fix, this completion code is unnecessarily
complex and brittle if you ask me.

That said I don't think your fix is 100%.

Consider this scenario:

# 1. writer queues first record on CPU0
# 2. encrypt completes on CPU1

 	pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
	# pending is 0
 
# IRQ comes and CPU1 goes off to do something else with spin lock held
# writer proceeds to encrypt next record on CPU0
# writer is done, enters wait 

	smp_store_mb(ctx->async_notify, true);

# Now CPU1 is back from the interrupt, does the check

 	if (!pending && READ_ONCE(ctx->async_notify))
 		complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);

# and it completes the wait, even though the atomic decrypt_pending was
#   bumped back to 1 

You need to hold the lock around the async_notify false -> true
transition as well. The store no longer needs to have a barrier.

For async_notify true -> false transitions please add a comment 
saying that there can be no concurrent accesses, since we have no
pending crypt operations.


Another way to solve this would be to add a large value to the pending
counter to indicate that there is a waiter:

	if (atomic_add_and_fetch(&decrypt_pending, 1000) > 1000)
		wait();
	else
		reinit();
	atomic_sub(decrypt_pending, 1000)

completion:

	if (atomic_dec_return(&decrypt_pending) == 1000)
		complete()