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Date:   Tue, 26 May 2020 14:58:11 +0000
From:   Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>
To:     jeyu@...nel.org, davem@...emloft.net, kuba@...nel.org
Cc:     michael.chan@...adcom.com, dchickles@...vell.com,
        sburla@...vell.com, fmanlunas@...vell.com, aelior@...vell.com,
        GR-everest-linux-l2@...vell.com, kvalo@...eaurora.org,
        johannes@...solutions.net, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
        arnd@...db.de, rostedt@...dmis.org, mingo@...hat.com,
        aquini@...hat.com, cai@....pw, dyoung@...hat.com, bhe@...hat.com,
        peterz@...radead.org, tglx@...utronix.de, gpiccoli@...onical.com,
        pmladek@...e.com, tiwai@...e.de, schlad@...e.de,
        andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com, derosier@...il.com,
        keescook@...omium.org, daniel.vetter@...ll.ch, will@...nel.org,
        mchehab+samsung@...nel.org, vkoul@...nel.org,
        mchehab+huawei@...nel.org, robh@...nel.org, mhiramat@...nel.org,
        sfr@...b.auug.org.au, linux@...inikbrodowski.net,
        glider@...gle.com, paulmck@...nel.org, elver@...gle.com,
        bauerman@...ux.ibm.com, yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com,
        samitolvanen@...gle.com, yzaikin@...gle.com, dvyukov@...gle.com,
        rdunlap@...radead.org, corbet@....net, dianders@...omium.org,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 4/8] panic: make taint data type clearer

Let us be clearer about the the data type for the taint flag.

Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>
---
 include/asm-generic/bug.h | 4 ++--
 include/linux/kernel.h    | 4 ++--
 kernel/panic.c            | 8 ++++----
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/asm-generic/bug.h b/include/asm-generic/bug.h
index c94e33ae3e7b..87dbe57301f4 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/bug.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/bug.h
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ struct bug_entry {
  */
 #ifndef __WARN_FLAGS
 extern __printf(4, 5)
-void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, const int line, unsigned taint,
+void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, const int line, unsigned int taint,
 		       const char *fmt, ...);
 #define __WARN()		__WARN_printf(TAINT_WARN, NULL)
 #define __WARN_printf(taint, arg...) do {				\
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ extern __printf(1, 2) void __warn_printk(const char *fmt, ...);
 struct warn_args;
 struct pt_regs;
 
-void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint,
+void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned int taint,
 	    struct pt_regs *regs, struct warn_args *args);
 
 #ifndef WARN_ON
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index a1974907c320..d154844eb9cd 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -563,8 +563,8 @@ enum lockdep_ok {
 	LOCKDEP_STILL_OK,
 	LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE
 };
-extern void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok);
-extern int test_taint(unsigned flag);
+extern void add_taint(unsigned int flag, enum lockdep_ok);
+extern int test_taint(unsigned int flag);
 extern unsigned long get_taint(void);
 extern int root_mountflags;
 
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index cb1c5619e983..3cfe84318ecf 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ const char *print_tainted(void)
 	return buf;
 }
 
-int test_taint(unsigned flag)
+int test_taint(unsigned int flag)
 {
 	return test_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
 }
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ unsigned long get_taint(void)
  * If something bad has gone wrong, you'll want @lockdebug_ok = false, but for
  * some notewortht-but-not-corrupting cases, it can be set to true.
  */
-void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok)
+void add_taint(unsigned int flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok)
 {
 	if (lockdep_ok == LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE && __debug_locks_off()) {
 		pr_warn("Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n");
@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ struct warn_args {
 	va_list args;
 };
 
-void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint,
+void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned int taint,
 	    struct pt_regs *regs, struct warn_args *args)
 {
 	disable_trace_on_warning();
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint,
 }
 
 #ifndef __WARN_FLAGS
-void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, int line, unsigned taint,
+void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, int line, unsigned int taint,
 		       const char *fmt, ...)
 {
 	struct warn_args args;
-- 
2.26.2

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