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Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 23:13:16 -0700
From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
To: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>, jakub@...udflare.com
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [bpf PATCH] bpf: sockmap, remove bucket->lock from
sock_{hash|map}_free
On 3/10/20 9:41 AM, John Fastabend wrote:
> The bucket->lock is not needed in the sock_hash_free and sock_map_free
> calls, in fact it is causing a splat due to being inside rcu block.
>
>
> | BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/core/sock.c:2935
> | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 62, name: kworker/0:1
> | 3 locks held by kworker/0:1/62:
> | #0: ffff88813b019748 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d7/0x5e0
> | #1: ffffc900000abe50 ((work_completion)(&map->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d7/0x5e0
> | #2: ffff8881381f6df8 (&stab->lock){+...}, at: sock_map_free+0x26/0x180
> | CPU: 0 PID: 62 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.5.0-04008-g7b083332376e #454
> | Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190727_073836-buildvm-ppc64le-16.ppc.fedoraproject.org-3.fc31 04/01/2014
> | Workqueue: events bpf_map_free_deferred
> | Call Trace:
> | dump_stack+0x71/0xa0
> | ___might_sleep.cold+0xa6/0xb6
> | lock_sock_nested+0x28/0x90
> | sock_map_free+0x5f/0x180
> | bpf_map_free_deferred+0x58/0x80
> | process_one_work+0x260/0x5e0
> | worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
> | kthread+0x108/0x140
> | ? process_one_work+0x5e0/0x5e0
> | ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
> | ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
>
> The reason we have stab->lock and bucket->locks in sockmap code is to
> handle checking EEXIST in update/delete cases. We need to be careful during
> an update operation that we check for EEXIST and we need to ensure that the
> psock object is not in some partial state of removal/insertion while we do
> this. So both map_update_common and sock_map_delete need to guard from being
> run together potentially deleting an entry we are checking, etc. But by the
> time we get to the tear-down code in sock_{ma[|hash}_free we have already
> disconnected the map and we just did synchronize_rcu() in the line above so
> no updates/deletes should be in flight. Because of this we can drop the
> bucket locks from the map free'ing code, noting no update/deletes can be
> in-flight.
>
> Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
> Reported-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@...udflare.com>
> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@...udflare.com>
> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
> ---
> net/core/sock_map.c | 12 ++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
> index 085cef5..b70c844 100644
> --- a/net/core/sock_map.c
> +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
> @@ -233,8 +233,11 @@ static void sock_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
> struct bpf_stab *stab = container_of(map, struct bpf_stab, map);
> int i;
>
> + /* After the sync no updates or deletes will be in-flight so it
> + * is safe to walk map and remove entries without risking a race
> + * in EEXIST update case.
What prevents other cpus from deleting stuff in sock_hash_delete_elem() ?
What state has been changed before the synchronize_rcu() call here,
that other cpus check before attempting a delete ?
Typically, synchronize_rcu() only makes sense if readers can not start a new cycle.
A possible fix would be to check in sock_hash_delete_elem() (and possibly others methods)
if map->refcnt is not zero.
syzbot found : (no repro yet)
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xfbd59c0000000024: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000120-0xdead000000000127]
CPU: 2 PID: 14305 Comm: kworker/2:3 Not tainted 5.7.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events bpf_map_free_deferred
RIP: 0010:__write_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:279 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__hlist_del include/linux/list.h:811 [inline]
RIP: 0010:hlist_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:485 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_hash_free+0x202/0x4a0 net/core/sock_map.c:1021
Code: 0f 85 15 02 00 00 4c 8d 7b 28 4c 8b 63 20 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 47 02 00 00 4c 8b 6b 28 4c 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 0f 85 25 02 00 00 4d 85 e4 4d 89 65 00 74 20 e8 f6 82
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ba7c38 EFLAGS: 00010a06
RAX: 1bd5a00000000024 RBX: ffff88801d866700 RCX: ffffffff8636ae84
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8636afe9 RDI: ffff88801d866720
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff888022765080 R09: fffffbfff185f952
R10: ffffffff8c2fca8f R11: fffffbfff185f951 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: dead000000000122 R14: dead000000000122 R15: ffff88801d866728
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88802d000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f27551a9db8 CR3: 0000000056530000 CR4: 0000000000340ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
bpf_map_free_deferred+0xb2/0x100 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:471
process_one_work+0x965/0x16a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2268
worker_thread+0x96/0xe20 kernel/workqueue.c:2414
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:268
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:351
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace da3ce2417ae8d343 ]---
RIP: 0010:__write_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:279 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__hlist_del include/linux/list.h:811 [inline]
RIP: 0010:hlist_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:485 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_hash_free+0x202/0x4a0 net/core/sock_map.c:1021
Code: 0f 85 15 02 00 00 4c 8d 7b 28 4c 8b 63 20 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 47 02 00 00 4c 8b 6b 28 4c 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 0f 85 25 02 00 00 4d 85 e4 4d 89 65 00 74 20 e8 f6 82
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ba7c38 EFLAGS: 00010a06
RAX: 1bd5a00000000024 RBX: ffff88801d866700 RCX: ffffffff8636ae84
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8636afe9 RDI: ffff88801d866720
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff888022765080 R09: fffffbfff185f952
R10: ffffffff8c2fca8f R11: fffffbfff185f951 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: dead000000000122 R14: dead000000000122 R15: ffff88801d866728
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88802d000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1e5e3c6290 CR3: 000000001347f000 CR4: 0000000000340ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> + */
> synchronize_rcu();
> - raw_spin_lock_bh(&stab->lock);
> for (i = 0; i < stab->map.max_entries; i++) {
> struct sock **psk = &stab->sks[i];
> struct sock *sk;
> @@ -248,7 +251,6 @@ static void sock_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
> release_sock(sk);
> }
> }
> - raw_spin_unlock_bh(&stab->lock);
>
> /* wait for psock readers accessing its map link */
> synchronize_rcu();
> @@ -863,10 +865,13 @@ static void sock_hash_free(struct bpf_map *map)
> struct hlist_node *node;
> int i;
>
> + /* After the sync no updates or deletes will be in-flight so it
> + * is safe to walk map and remove entries without risking a race
> + * in EEXIST update case.
> + */
> synchronize_rcu();
> for (i = 0; i < htab->buckets_num; i++) {
> bucket = sock_hash_select_bucket(htab, i);
> - raw_spin_lock_bh(&bucket->lock);
> hlist_for_each_entry_safe(elem, node, &bucket->head, node) {
> hlist_del_rcu(&elem->node);
> lock_sock(elem->sk);
> @@ -875,7 +880,6 @@ static void sock_hash_free(struct bpf_map *map)
> rcu_read_unlock();
> release_sock(elem->sk);
> }
> - raw_spin_unlock_bh(&bucket->lock);
> }
>
> /* wait for psock readers accessing its map link */
>
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