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Message-Id: <20200608231211.3363633-77-sashal@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2020 19:03:22 -0400
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@...il.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.6 077/606] bpf: Restrict bpf_trace_printk()'s %s usage and add %pks, %pus specifier
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
commit b2a5212fb634561bb734c6356904e37f6665b955 upstream.
Usage of plain %s conversion specifier in bpf_trace_printk() suffers from the
very same issue as bpf_probe_read{,str}() helpers, that is, it is broken on
archs with overlapping address ranges.
While the helpers have been addressed through work in 6ae08ae3dea2 ("bpf: Add
probe_read_{user, kernel} and probe_read_{user, kernel}_str helpers"), we need
an option for bpf_trace_printk() as well to fix it.
Similarly as with the helpers, force users to make an explicit choice by adding
%pks and %pus specifier to bpf_trace_printk() which will then pick the corresponding
strncpy_from_unsafe*() variant to perform the access under KERNEL_DS or USER_DS.
The %pk* (kernel specifier) and %pu* (user specifier) can later also be extended
for other objects aside strings that are probed and printed under tracing, and
reused out of other facilities like bpf_seq_printf() or BTF based type printing.
Existing behavior of %s for current users is still kept working for archs where it
is not broken and therefore gated through CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE.
For archs not having this property we fall-back to pick probing under KERNEL_DS as
a sensible default.
Fixes: 8d3b7dce8622 ("bpf: add support for %s specifier to bpf_trace_printk()")
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@...il.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200515101118.6508-4-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst | 14 ++++
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 94 +++++++++++++++--------
lib/vsprintf.c | 12 +++
3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst b/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
index 8ebe46b1af39..5dfcc4592b23 100644
--- a/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
+++ b/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
@@ -112,6 +112,20 @@ used when printing stack backtraces. The specifier takes into
consideration the effect of compiler optimisations which may occur
when tail-calls are used and marked with the noreturn GCC attribute.
+Probed Pointers from BPF / tracing
+----------------------------------
+
+::
+
+ %pks kernel string
+ %pus user string
+
+The ``k`` and ``u`` specifiers are used for printing prior probed memory from
+either kernel memory (k) or user memory (u). The subsequent ``s`` specifier
+results in printing a string. For direct use in regular vsnprintf() the (k)
+and (u) annotation is ignored, however, when used out of BPF's bpf_trace_printk(),
+for example, it reads the memory it is pointing to without faulting.
+
Kernel Pointers
---------------
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index 68250d433bd7..b899a2d7e900 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -325,17 +325,15 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_get_probe_write_proto(void)
/*
* Only limited trace_printk() conversion specifiers allowed:
- * %d %i %u %x %ld %li %lu %lx %lld %lli %llu %llx %p %s
+ * %d %i %u %x %ld %li %lu %lx %lld %lli %llu %llx %p %pks %pus %s
*/
BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
u64, arg2, u64, arg3)
{
+ int i, mod[3] = {}, fmt_cnt = 0;
+ char buf[64], fmt_ptype;
+ void *unsafe_ptr = NULL;
bool str_seen = false;
- int mod[3] = {};
- int fmt_cnt = 0;
- u64 unsafe_addr;
- char buf[64];
- int i;
/*
* bpf_check()->check_func_arg()->check_stack_boundary()
@@ -361,40 +359,71 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
if (fmt[i] == 'l') {
mod[fmt_cnt]++;
i++;
- } else if (fmt[i] == 'p' || fmt[i] == 's') {
+ } else if (fmt[i] == 'p') {
mod[fmt_cnt]++;
+ if ((fmt[i + 1] == 'k' ||
+ fmt[i + 1] == 'u') &&
+ fmt[i + 2] == 's') {
+ fmt_ptype = fmt[i + 1];
+ i += 2;
+ goto fmt_str;
+ }
+
/* disallow any further format extensions */
if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 &&
!isspace(fmt[i + 1]) &&
!ispunct(fmt[i + 1]))
return -EINVAL;
- fmt_cnt++;
- if (fmt[i] == 's') {
- if (str_seen)
- /* allow only one '%s' per fmt string */
- return -EINVAL;
- str_seen = true;
-
- switch (fmt_cnt) {
- case 1:
- unsafe_addr = arg1;
- arg1 = (long) buf;
- break;
- case 2:
- unsafe_addr = arg2;
- arg2 = (long) buf;
- break;
- case 3:
- unsafe_addr = arg3;
- arg3 = (long) buf;
- break;
- }
- buf[0] = 0;
- strncpy_from_unsafe(buf,
- (void *) (long) unsafe_addr,
+
+ goto fmt_next;
+ } else if (fmt[i] == 's') {
+ mod[fmt_cnt]++;
+ fmt_ptype = fmt[i];
+fmt_str:
+ if (str_seen)
+ /* allow only one '%s' per fmt string */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ str_seen = true;
+
+ if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 &&
+ !isspace(fmt[i + 1]) &&
+ !ispunct(fmt[i + 1]))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (fmt_cnt) {
+ case 0:
+ unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg1;
+ arg1 = (long)buf;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg2;
+ arg2 = (long)buf;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg3;
+ arg3 = (long)buf;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ buf[0] = 0;
+ switch (fmt_ptype) {
+ case 's':
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
+ strncpy_from_unsafe(buf, unsafe_ptr,
sizeof(buf));
+ break;
+#endif
+ case 'k':
+ strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(buf, unsafe_ptr,
+ sizeof(buf));
+ break;
+ case 'u':
+ strncpy_from_unsafe_user(buf,
+ (__force void __user *)unsafe_ptr,
+ sizeof(buf));
+ break;
}
- continue;
+ goto fmt_next;
}
if (fmt[i] == 'l') {
@@ -405,6 +434,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
if (fmt[i] != 'i' && fmt[i] != 'd' &&
fmt[i] != 'u' && fmt[i] != 'x')
return -EINVAL;
+fmt_next:
fmt_cnt++;
}
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 7c488a1ce318..532b6606a18a 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -2168,6 +2168,10 @@ char *fwnode_string(char *buf, char *end, struct fwnode_handle *fwnode,
* f full name
* P node name, including a possible unit address
* - 'x' For printing the address. Equivalent to "%lx".
+ * - '[ku]s' For a BPF/tracing related format specifier, e.g. used out of
+ * bpf_trace_printk() where [ku] prefix specifies either kernel (k)
+ * or user (u) memory to probe, and:
+ * s a string, equivalent to "%s" on direct vsnprintf() use
*
* ** When making changes please also update:
* Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst
@@ -2251,6 +2255,14 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
if (!IS_ERR(ptr))
break;
return err_ptr(buf, end, ptr, spec);
+ case 'u':
+ case 'k':
+ switch (fmt[1]) {
+ case 's':
+ return string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
+ default:
+ return error_string(buf, end, "(einval)", spec);
+ }
}
/* default is to _not_ leak addresses, hash before printing */
--
2.25.1
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