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Message-Id: <20200702013933.4157053-1-edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2020 18:39:33 -0700
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
To: "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>
Subject: [PATCH net] tcp: md5: allow changing MD5 keys in all socket states
This essentially reverts commit 721230326891 ("tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG
or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets")
Mathieu reported that many vendors BGP implementations can
actually switch TCP MD5 on established flows.
Quoting Mathieu :
Here is a list of a few network vendors along with their behavior
with respect to TCP MD5:
- Cisco: Allows for password to be changed, but within the hold-down
timer (~180 seconds).
- Juniper: When password is initially set on active connection it will
reset, but after that any subsequent password changes no network
resets.
- Nokia: No notes on if they flap the tcp connection or not.
- Ericsson/RedBack: Allows for 2 password (old/new) to co-exist until
both sides are ok with new passwords.
- Meta-Switch: Expects the password to be set before a connection is
attempted, but no further info on whether they reset the TCP
connection on a change.
- Avaya: Disable the neighbor, then set password, then re-enable.
- Zebos: Would normally allow the change when socket connected.
We can revert my prior change because commit 9424e2e7ad93 ("tcp: md5: fix potential
overestimation of TCP option space") removed the leak of 4 kernel bytes to
the wire that was the main reason for my patch.
While doing my investigations, I found a bug when a MD5 key is changed, leading
to these commits that stable teams want to consider before backporting this revert :
Commit 6a2febec338d ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()")
Commit e6ced831ef11 ("tcp: md5: refine tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() barriers")
Fixes: 721230326891 "tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets"
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Reported-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>
---
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 5 +----
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index c33f7c6aff8eea81d374644cd251bd2b96292651..861fbd84c9cf58af4126c80a27925cd6f70f300d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -3246,10 +3246,7 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
case TCP_MD5SIG:
case TCP_MD5SIG_EXT:
- if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN))
- err = tp->af_specific->md5_parse(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
- else
- err = -EINVAL;
+ err = tp->af_specific->md5_parse(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
break;
#endif
case TCP_USER_TIMEOUT:
--
2.27.0.212.ge8ba1cc988-goog
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