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Date:   Sun, 2 Aug 2020 22:26:04 +0000
From:   Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@...rosoft.com>
To:     Andres Beltran <lkmlabelt@...il.com>,
        KY Srinivasan <kys@...rosoft.com>,
        Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@...rosoft.com>,
        "wei.liu@...nel.org" <wei.liu@...nel.org>
CC:     "linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org" <linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>,
        "parri.andrea@...il.com" <parri.andrea@...il.com>,
        Saruhan Karademir <skarade@...rosoft.com>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        "netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH] hv_netvsc: Add validation for untrusted Hyper-V values



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Andres Beltran <lkmlabelt@...il.com>
> Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 6:53 PM
> To: KY Srinivasan <kys@...rosoft.com>; Haiyang Zhang
> <haiyangz@...rosoft.com>; Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@...rosoft.com>;
> wei.liu@...nel.org
> Cc: linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org; linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org; Michael
> Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>; parri.andrea@...il.com; Saruhan
> Karademir <skarade@...rosoft.com>; Andres Beltran <lkmlabelt@...il.com>;
> David S . Miller <davem@...emloft.net>; Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>;
> netdev@...r.kernel.org
> Subject: [PATCH] hv_netvsc: Add validation for untrusted Hyper-V values
> 
> For additional robustness in the face of Hyper-V errors or malicious
> behavior, validate all values that originate from packets that Hyper-V
> has sent to the guest in the host-to-guest ring buffer. Ensure that
> invalid values cannot cause indexing off the end of an array, or
> subvert an existing validation via integer overflow. Ensure that
> outgoing packets do not have any leftover guest memory that has not
> been zeroed out.
> 
> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
> Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Andres Beltran <lkmlabelt@...il.com>
> ---
>  drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h   |  4 ++
>  drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c       | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c   |  7 +++
>  drivers/net/hyperv/rndis_filter.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++---
>  4 files changed, 163 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h b/drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h
> index f43b614f2345..7df5943fa46f 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h
> +++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h
> @@ -860,6 +860,10 @@ static inline u32 netvsc_rqstor_size(unsigned long
> ringbytes)
>  	       ringbytes / NETVSC_MIN_IN_MSG_SIZE;
>  }
> 
> +#define NETVSC_XFER_HEADER_SIZE(rng_cnt) \
> +		(offsetof(struct vmtransfer_page_packet_header, ranges) + \
> +		(rng_cnt) * sizeof(struct vmtransfer_page_range))
> +
>  struct multi_send_data {
>  	struct sk_buff *skb; /* skb containing the pkt */
>  	struct hv_netvsc_packet *pkt; /* netvsc pkt pending */
> diff --git a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c
> index 79b907a29433..7aa5276a1f36 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c
> @@ -398,6 +398,15 @@ static int netvsc_init_buf(struct hv_device *device,
>  	net_device->recv_section_size = resp->sections[0].sub_alloc_size;
>  	net_device->recv_section_cnt = resp->sections[0].num_sub_allocs;
> 
> +	/* Ensure buffer will not overflow */
> +	if (net_device->recv_section_size < NETVSC_MTU_MIN ||
> (u64)net_device->recv_section_size *
> +	    (u64)net_device->recv_section_cnt > (u64)buf_size) {
> +		netdev_err(ndev, "invalid recv_section_size %u\n",
> +			   net_device->recv_section_size);
> +		ret = -EINVAL;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> +
>  	/* Setup receive completion ring.
>  	 * Add 1 to the recv_section_cnt because at least one entry in a
>  	 * ring buffer has to be empty.
> @@ -479,6 +488,12 @@ static int netvsc_init_buf(struct hv_device *device,
>  	/* Parse the response */
>  	net_device->send_section_size = init_packet->msg.
>  				v1_msg.send_send_buf_complete.section_size;
> +	if (net_device->send_section_size < NETVSC_MTU_MIN) {
> +		netdev_err(ndev, "invalid send_section_size %u\n",
> +			   net_device->send_section_size);
> +		ret = -EINVAL;
> +		goto cleanup;
> +	}
> 
>  	/* Section count is simply the size divided by the section size. */
>  	net_device->send_section_cnt = buf_size / net_device-
> >send_section_size;
> @@ -770,12 +785,24 @@ static void netvsc_send_completion(struct
> net_device *ndev,
>  				   int budget)
>  {
>  	const struct nvsp_message *nvsp_packet = hv_pkt_data(desc);
> +	u32 msglen = hv_pkt_datalen(desc);
> +
> +	/* Ensure packet is big enough to read header fields */
> +	if (msglen < sizeof(struct nvsp_message_header)) {
> +		netdev_err(ndev, "nvsp_message length too small: %u\n",
> msglen);
> +		return;
> +	}
> 
>  	switch (nvsp_packet->hdr.msg_type) {
>  	case NVSP_MSG_TYPE_INIT_COMPLETE:
>  	case NVSP_MSG1_TYPE_SEND_RECV_BUF_COMPLETE:
>  	case NVSP_MSG1_TYPE_SEND_SEND_BUF_COMPLETE:
>  	case NVSP_MSG5_TYPE_SUBCHANNEL:
> +		if (msglen < sizeof(struct nvsp_message)) {
> +			netdev_err(ndev, "nvsp_msg5 length too small: %u\n",
> +				   msglen);
> +			return;
> +		}

struct nvsp_message includes all message types, so its length is the longest type,
The messages from older host version are not necessarily reaching the 
sizeof(struct nvsp_message).

Testing on both new and older hosts are recommended, in case I didn't find out all issues
like this one.

Thanks,
- Haiyang

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