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Message-ID: <CAHk-=wiKiE1RvJ9mRYg5y94eC5RVmw+GHmy9B9zHZkZo0w0sNA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 18:02:18 -0700
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@...il.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Amit Klein <aksecurity@...il.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
stable <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Flaw in "random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity"
On Tue, Aug 4, 2020 at 5:52 PM Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@...il.com> wrote:
>
> TL;DR This change takes the seed data from get_random_bytes and broadcasts it to the network, thereby destroying the security of dev/random. This change needs to be reverted and redesigned.
This was discussed.,
It's theoretical, not practical.
The patch improves real security, and the fake "but in theory" kind is
meaningless and people should stop that kind of behavior.
Linus
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