netdev - Re: Flaw in "random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity"

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Sat, 8 Aug 2020 19:03:43 +0000
From:   George Spelvin <lkml@....ORG>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:     netdev@...r.kernel.org, w@....eu, aksecurity@...il.com,
        torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, edumazet@...gle.com,
        Jason@...c4.com, luto@...nel.org, keescook@...omium.org,
        tglx@...utronix.de, peterz@...radead.org, tytso@....edu,
        lkml.mplumb@...il.com, stephen@...workplumber.org
Subject: Re: Flaw in "random32: update the net random state on interrupt and
 activity"

On Sat, Aug 08, 2020 at 10:07:51AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>    - Cryptographically strong ChaCha, batched
>>    - Cryptographically strong ChaCha, with anti-backtracking.
> 
> I think we should just anti-backtrack everything.  With the "fast key 
> erasure" construction, already implemented in my patchset for the 
> buffered bytes, this is extremely fast.

The problem is that this is really *amorized* key erasure, and
requires large buffers to amortize the cost down to a reasonable
level.

E,g, if using 256-bit (32-byte) keys, 5% overhead would require generating
640 bytes at a time.

Are we okay with ~1K per core for this?  Which we might have to
throw away occasionally to incorporate fresh seed material?

You're right that the simplification in usage is a benefit.