[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Sat, 8 Aug 2020 13:52:37 -0700
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: George Spelvin <lkml@....org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>, Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Amit Klein <aksecurity@...il.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@...il.com>,
Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>
Subject: Re: Flaw in "random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity"
On Sat, Aug 8, 2020 at 1:47 PM George Spelvin <lkml@....org> wrote:
>
> I *just* finished explaining, using dribs and drabs of entropy allows an
> *information theoretical attack* which *no* crypto can prevent.
The key word here being "theoretical".
The other key word is "reality".
We will have to agree to disagree. I don't _care_ about the
theoretical holes. I care about the real ones.
We plugged a real one. Deal with it.
Linus
Powered by blists - more mailing lists