lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening PHC | |
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Sat, 8 Aug 2020 13:52:37 -0700 From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> To: George Spelvin <lkml@....org> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>, Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, Amit Klein <aksecurity@...il.com>, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@...il.com>, Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org> Subject: Re: Flaw in "random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity" On Sat, Aug 8, 2020 at 1:47 PM George Spelvin <lkml@....org> wrote: > > I *just* finished explaining, using dribs and drabs of entropy allows an > *information theoretical attack* which *no* crypto can prevent. The key word here being "theoretical". The other key word is "reality". We will have to agree to disagree. I don't _care_ about the theoretical holes. I care about the real ones. We plugged a real one. Deal with it. Linus
Powered by blists - more mailing lists