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Date:   Tue, 11 Aug 2020 05:26:49 +0000
From:   George Spelvin <lkml@....ORG>
To:     Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>,
        Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Amit Klein <aksecurity@...il.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
        Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@...il.com>,
        Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>,
        George Spelvin <lkml@....ORG>
Subject: Re: [DRAFT PATCH] random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable

On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 11:04:55PM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> What could be improved is the way the input values are mixed (just
> added hence commutative for now). I didn't want to call a siphash
> round on the hot paths, but just shifting the previous noise value
> before adding would work, such as the following for example:
> 
>   void prandom_u32_add_noise(a, b, c, d)
>   {
>   	unsigned long *noise = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_noise);
> 
>   #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
> 	*noise = rol64(*noise, 7) + a + b + c + d;
>   #else
> 	*noise = rol32(*noise, 7) + a + b + c + d;
>   #endif
>   	put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_noise);
> 
>   }

If you think this is enough seed material, I'm fine with it.

I don't hugely like the fact that you sum all the inputs, since
entropy tends to be concentrated in the low-order words, and summing
risks cancellation.

You can't afford even one SIPROUND as a non-cryptographic hash?  E.g.

DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long[4], net_rand_noise);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(net_rand_noise);

void prandom_u32_add_noise(a, b, c, d)
{
	unsigned long *noise = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_noise);

	a ^= noise[0];
	b ^= noise[1];
	c ^= noise[2];
	d ^= noise[3];
	/*
	 * This is not used cryptographically; it's just
	 * a convenient 4-word hash function.
	 */
	SIPROUND(a, b, c, d);
	noise[0] = a;
	noise[1] = b;
	noise[2] = c;
	put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_noise);
}

(And then you mix in net_rand_noise[0].)

Other options are HASH_MIX() from fs/namei.c, but that's
more sequential.

There's also a simple Xorshift generator.

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