Message-ID: <80223f16-efe3-7a43-cd88-4ec323d2c477@fb.com>
Date:   Thu, 20 Aug 2020 07:45:02 -0700
From:   Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>
To:     Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>,
        John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
CC:     Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@...udflare.com>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        kernel-team <kernel-team@...udflare.com>,
        Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 5/6] bpf: sockmap: allow update from BPF



On 8/20/20 4:33 AM, Lorenz Bauer wrote:
> On Wed, 19 Aug 2020 at 23:41, John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com> wrote:
>>
>> John Fastabend wrote:
>>> Lorenz Bauer wrote:
>>>> Allow calling bpf_map_update_elem on sockmap and sockhash from a BPF
>>>> context. The synchronization required for this is a bit fiddly: we
>>>> need to prevent the socket from changing it's state while we add it
>>>> to the sockmap, since we rely on getting a callback via
>>>> sk_prot->unhash. However, we can't just lock_sock like in
>>>> sock_map_sk_acquire because that might sleep. So instead we disable
>>>> softirq processing and use bh_lock_sock to prevent further
>>>> modification.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>   kernel/bpf/verifier.c |  6 ++++--
>>>>   net/core/sock_map.c   | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>>   2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>>>> index 47f9b94bb9d4..421fccf18dea 100644
>>>> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>>>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>>>> @@ -4254,7 +4254,8 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>>>>                  func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
>>>>                  func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map &&
>>>>                  func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport &&
>>>> -               func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
>>>> +               func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
>>>> +               func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
>>>>                      goto error;
>>>>              break;
>>>>      case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
>>>> @@ -4263,7 +4264,8 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>>>>                  func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
>>>>                  func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash &&
>>>>                  func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport &&
>>>> -               func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
>>>> +               func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
>>>> +               func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
>>>
>>> I lost track of a detail here, map_lookup_elem should return
>>> PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL but if we want to feed that back into
>>> the map_update_elem() we need to return PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL
>>> and then presumably have a null check to get a PTR_TO_SOCKET
>>> type as expect.
>>>
>>> Can we use the same logic for expected arg (previous patch) on the
>>> ret_type. Or did I miss it:/ Need some coffee I guess.
>>
>> OK, I tracked this down. It looks like we rely on mark_ptr_or_null_reg()
>> to update the reg->tyype to PTR_TO_SOCKET. I do wonder if it would be
>> a bit more straight forward to do something similar to the previous
>> patch and refine it earlier to PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, but should be
>> safe as-is for now.
> 
> Yes, it took me a while to figure this out as well. I think we can use
> the same approach, but I wanted to keep this series simple.
> 
>> I still have the below question though.
>>
>>>
>>>>                      goto error;
>>>>              break;
>>>>      case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY:
>>>> diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
>>>> index 018367fb889f..b2c886c34566 100644
>>>> --- a/net/core/sock_map.c
>>>> +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
>>>> @@ -603,6 +603,28 @@ int sock_map_update_elem_sys(struct bpf_map *map, void *key,
>>>>      return ret;
>>>>   }
>>>>
>>>> +static int sock_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key,
>>>> +                           void *value, u64 flags)
>>>> +{
>>>> +   struct sock *sk = (struct sock *)value;
>>>> +   int ret;
>>>> +
>>>> +   if (!sock_map_sk_is_suitable(sk))
>>>> +           return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>> +
>>>> +   local_bh_disable();
>>>> +   bh_lock_sock(sk);
>>>
>>> How do ensure we are not being called from some context which
>>> already has the bh_lock_sock() held? It seems we can call map_update_elem()
>>> from any context, kprobes, tc, xdp, etc.?
> 
> Yeah, to be honest I'm not entirely sure.
> 
> XDP, TC, sk_lookup are fine I think. We have bpf_sk_lookup_tcp and
> friends, but these aren't locked, and the BPF doesn't run in a context
> where there is a locked socket.
> 
> As you point out, kprobes / tracing is problematic because the probe
> _can_ run at a point where an sk is locked. If the tracing program
> somehow gets a hold of this socket via sk_lookup_* or
> a sockmap the program could deadlock.

Thanks for John to bring this up. I looked at codes a few times
but somehow missed the potential deadlock issues.

kprobes/non-iter tracing/perf_event, freplace of these kprobes etc. 
programs, may have issues. tracepoint probably not since people
probably won't add tracepoint inside a spinlock.

> 
> bpf_sock_ops is also problematic since ctx->sk is in various states of
> locking. For example, BPF_SOCK_OPS_TCP_LISTEN_CB is called with
> lock_sock held, so unproblematic. BPF_SOCK_OPS_ACTIVE_ESTABLISHED_CB
> on the other hand is called with the spinlock held.
> 
> It seems to me like the only option is to instead only allow updates
> from "safe" contexts, such as XDP, tc, bpf_iter etc.

This should be okay, I think. You can start from small and then
grows as more use cases emerge.

> 
> Am I missing something?
> 
> 
>>>
>>>> +   if (!sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk))
>>>> +           ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>> +   else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
>>>> +           ret = sock_map_update_common(map, *(u32 *)key, sk, flags);
>>>> +   else
>>>> +           ret = sock_hash_update_common(map, key, sk, flags);
>>>> +   bh_unlock_sock(sk);
>>>> +   local_bh_enable();
>>>> +   return ret;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>>   BPF_CALL_4(bpf_sock_map_update, struct bpf_sock_ops_kern *, sops,
>>>>         struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key, u64, flags)
>>>>   {
>>>> @@ -687,6 +709,7 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops sock_map_ops = {
>>>>      .map_free               = sock_map_free,
>>>>      .map_get_next_key       = sock_map_get_next_key,
>>>>      .map_lookup_elem_sys_only = sock_map_lookup_sys,
>>>> +   .map_update_elem        = sock_map_update_elem,
>>>>      .map_delete_elem        = sock_map_delete_elem,
>>>>      .map_lookup_elem        = sock_map_lookup,
>>>>      .map_release_uref       = sock_map_release_progs,
>>>> @@ -1180,6 +1203,7 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops sock_hash_ops = {
>>>>      .map_alloc              = sock_hash_alloc,
>>>>      .map_free               = sock_hash_free,
>>>>      .map_get_next_key       = sock_hash_get_next_key,
>>>> +   .map_update_elem        = sock_map_update_elem,
>>>>      .map_delete_elem        = sock_hash_delete_elem,
>>>>      .map_lookup_elem        = sock_hash_lookup,
>>>>      .map_lookup_elem_sys_only = sock_hash_lookup_sys,
>>>> --
>>>> 2.25.1
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
> 
> 
> --
> Lorenz Bauer  |  Systems Engineer
> 6th Floor, County Hall/The Riverside Building, SE1 7PB, UK
> 
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.cloudflare.com&d=DwIBaQ&c=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw&r=DA8e1B5r073vIqRrFz7MRA&m=1Gk85bZFwViEPzlsGBklXLgdbxI4Q9F505taA25KfBI&s=pcsCdyC4ZCnSqXgJJc4rjmFx1C8Hiz49KCOxDf6gagg&e=
> 

Powered by blists - more mailing lists