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Message-ID: <20200827201536.GB11789@moon.secunet.de>
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2020 22:15:36 +0200
From: Antony Antony <antony.antony@...unet.com>
To: Antony Antony <antony.antony@...unet.com>
CC: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>,
<netdev@...r.kernel.org>, <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
<smueller@...onox.de>, <antony@...nome.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH ipsec-next v3] xfrm: add
/proc/sys/core/net/xfrm_redact_secret
Hi David,
On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 08:00:38 +0200, Antony Antony wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 15:42:22 -0700, David Miller wrote:
> > From: Antony Antony <antony.antony@...unet.com>
> > Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 20:35:49 +0200
> >
> > > Redacting secret is a FIPS 140-2 requirement.
> >
> > Why not control this via the kernel lockdown mode rather than making
> > an ad-hoc API for this?
>
> Let me try to use kernel lockdown mode. thanks for the idea.
>
> From a quick googling I guess it would be part of "lockdown= confidentiality".
> I wonder if kernel lockdown would allow disabling just this one feature independent of other lockdowns.
I looked at kernel lockdown mode code and documentation. I am thinking xfrm_redact is probably not a kernel lockdown mode feature. There is no kernel lockdown setting per net namespace.
During an initial discussions of xfrm_redact we thought per namespace would be useful in some use cases.
If there is a way to set lockdown per net namespace it would be better than /proc/sys/core/net/xfrm_redact_secret.
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