netdev - Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 5/8] bpf: Fix context type resolving for extension programs

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Date:   Thu, 17 Sep 2020 19:10:10 +0200
From:   Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>
To:     Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>
Cc:     Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>,
        Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
        Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@...com>,
        John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
        Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
        Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@...hat.com>,
        KP Singh <kpsingh@...omium.org>,
        Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 5/8] bpf: Fix context type resolving for
 extension programs

Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com> writes:

> On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 12:59 PM Andrii Nakryiko
> <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 5:50 PM Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>
>> >
>> > Eelco reported we can't properly access arguments if the tracing
>> > program is attached to extension program.
>> >
>> > Having following program:
>> >
>> >   SEC("classifier/test_pkt_md_access")
>> >   int test_pkt_md_access(struct __sk_buff *skb)
>> >
>> > with its extension:
>> >
>> >   SEC("freplace/test_pkt_md_access")
>> >   int test_pkt_md_access_new(struct __sk_buff *skb)
>> >
>> > and tracing that extension with:
>> >
>> >   SEC("fentry/test_pkt_md_access_new")
>> >   int BPF_PROG(fentry, struct sk_buff *skb)
>> >
>> > It's not possible to access skb argument in the fentry program,
>> > with following error from verifier:
>> >
>> >   ; int BPF_PROG(fentry, struct sk_buff *skb)
>> >   0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
>> >   invalid bpf_context access off=0 size=8
>> >
>> > The problem is that btf_ctx_access gets the context type for the
>> > traced program, which is in this case the extension.
>> >
>> > But when we trace extension program, we want to get the context
>> > type of the program that the extension is attached to, so we can
>> > access the argument properly in the trace program.
>> >
>> > This version of the patch is tweaked slightly from Jiri's original one,
>> > since the refactoring in the previous patches means we have to get the
>> > target prog type from the new variable in prog->aux instead of directly
>> > from the target prog.
>> >
>> > Reported-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@...hat.com>
>> > Suggested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>
>> > Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>
>> > ---
>> >  kernel/bpf/btf.c |    9 ++++++++-
>> >  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
>> > index 9228af9917a8..55f7b2ba1cbd 100644
>> > --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
>> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
>> > @@ -3860,7 +3860,14 @@ bool btf_ctx_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type,
>> >
>> >         info->reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
>> >         if (tgt_prog) {
>> > -               ret = btf_translate_to_vmlinux(log, btf, t, tgt_prog->type, arg);
>> > +               enum bpf_prog_type tgt_type;
>> > +
>> > +               if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT)
>> > +                       tgt_type = tgt_prog->aux->tgt_prog_type;
>>
>> what if tgt_prog->aux->tgt_prog_type is also BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT? Should
>> this be a loop?
>
> ok, never mind this specifically. there is an explicit check
>
> if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) {
>     verbose(env, "Cannot recursively attach\n");
>     return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> that will prevent this.
>
> But, I think we still will be able to construct a long chain of
> fmod_ret -> freplace -> fmod_ret -> freplace -> and so on ad
> infinitum. Can you please construct such a selftest? And then we
> should probably fix those checks to also disallow FMOD_RET, in
> addition to BPF_TRACE_FENTRY/FEXIT (and someone more familiar with LSM
> prog type should check if that can cause any problems).

Huh, I thought fmod_ret was supposed to be for kernel functions only?
However, I can't really point to anywhere in the code that ensures this,
other than check_attach_modify_return(), but I think that will allow a
bpf function as long as its name starts with "security_" ?

Is there actually any use case for modify_return being attached to a BPF
function (you could just use freplace instead, couldn't you?). Or should
we just disallow that entirely (if I'm not missing somewhere it's
already blocked)?

-Toke