netdev - [PATCH bpf-next v4 09/11] bpf: check ARG_PTR_TO_SPINLOCK register type in check_func

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Message-Id: <20200921121227.255763-10-lmb@cloudflare.com>
Date:   Mon, 21 Sep 2020 13:12:25 +0100
From:   Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>
To:     ast@...nel.org, daniel@...earbox.net
Cc:     bpf@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>,
        Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v4 09/11] bpf: check ARG_PTR_TO_SPINLOCK register type in check_func_arg

Move the check for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE to check_func_arg, where all other
checking is done as well. Move the invocation of process_spin_lock away
from the register type checking, to allow a future refactoring.

Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 28 ++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index e09eedb30117..eefc8256df1c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3781,10 +3781,6 @@ static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 	struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
 	u64 val = reg->var_off.value;
 
-	if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
-		verbose(env, "R%d is not a pointer to map_value\n", regno);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 	if (!is_const) {
 		verbose(env,
 			"R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_spin_lock has to be at the constant offset\n",
@@ -3993,16 +3989,9 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,
 		if (type != expected_type)
 			goto err_type;
 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) {
-		if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) {
-			if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, true))
-				return -EACCES;
-		} else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) {
-			if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, false))
-				return -EACCES;
-		} else {
-			verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n");
-			return -EFAULT;
-		}
+		expected_type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
+		if (type != expected_type)
+			goto err_type;
 	} else if (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_type)) {
 		expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
 		/* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be
@@ -4108,6 +4097,17 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,
 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno,
 					      meta->map_ptr->value_size, false,
 					      meta);
+	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) {
+		if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) {
+			if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, true))
+				return -EACCES;
+		} else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) {
+			if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, false))
+				return -EACCES;
+		} else {
+			verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n");
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
 	} else if (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_type)) {
 		/* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the
 		 * next is_mem_size argument below.
-- 
2.25.1