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Message-ID: <CA+ASDXPiY5AQDu2snHSqBDA0BYi79_hmNAjsKmXm1cFrgoxo4Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 10:56:29 -0800
From: Brian Norris <briannorris@...omium.org>
To: Xiaohui Zhang <ruc_zhangxiaohui@....com>
Cc: Amitkumar Karwar <amitkarwar@...il.com>,
Ganapathi Bhat <ganapathi.bhat@....com>,
Xinming Hu <huxinming820@...il.com>,
Kalle Valo <kvalo@...eaurora.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
linux-wireless <linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org>,
"<netdev@...r.kernel.org>" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_uap_bss_param_prepare
(FWIW, this author's mail has been routed to my spam mailbox. That's
partly my fault and/or my "choice" of mail provider, but that's why I
only see these once Kalle replies to them.)
On Tue, Dec 8, 2020 at 8:03 AM Xiaohui Zhang <ruc_zhangxiaohui@....com> wrote:
>
> From: Zhang Xiaohui <ruc_zhangxiaohui@....com>
>
> mwifiex_uap_bss_param_prepare() calls memcpy() without checking
> the destination size may trigger a buffer overflower,
> which a local user could use to cause denial of service or the
> execution of arbitrary code.
> Fix it by putting the length check before calling memcpy().
>
> Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaohui <ruc_zhangxiaohui@....com>
> ---
> drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/uap_cmd.c | 3 ++-
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/uap_cmd.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/uap_cmd.c
> index b48a85d79..937c75e89 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/uap_cmd.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/uap_cmd.c
> @@ -502,7 +502,8 @@ mwifiex_uap_bss_param_prepare(u8 *tlv, void *cmd_buf, u16 *param_size)
> ssid = (struct host_cmd_tlv_ssid *)tlv;
> ssid->header.type = cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_UAP_SSID);
> ssid->header.len = cpu_to_le16((u16)bss_cfg->ssid.ssid_len);
> - memcpy(ssid->ssid, bss_cfg->ssid.ssid, bss_cfg->ssid.ssid_len);
> + memcpy(ssid->ssid, bss_cfg->ssid.ssid,
> + min_t(u32, bss_cfg->ssid.ssid_len, strlen(ssid->ssid)));
This strlen() check makes no sense to me. We are *writing* to
ssid->ssid, so its initial contents are either zero or garbage --
strlen() will either give a zero or unpredictable value. I'm pretty
sure that's not what you intend.
On the other hand, it's hard to determine what the proper bound here
*should* be. This 'ssid' struct is really just a pointer into
mwifiex_cmd_uap_sys_config()'s uap_sys_config (struct
host_cmd_ds_sys_config), which doesn't have any defined length -- its
length is only given by way of its surrounding buffers/structs.
Altogether, the code is hard to reason about.
Anyway, this patch is wrong, so NAK.
Brian
> cmd_size += sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header) +
> bss_cfg->ssid.ssid_len;
> tlv += sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header) +
> --
> 2.17.1
>
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