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Message-ID: <20201218151612.GC3576117@gauss3.secunet.de>
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2020 16:16:12 +0100
From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
To: Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik@...anetworks.com>
CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] xfrm: Fix oops in xfrm_replay_advance_bmp
On Mon, Dec 14, 2020 at 03:38:32PM +0200, Shmulik Ladkani wrote:
> When setting xfrm replay_window to values higher than 32, a rare
> page-fault occurs in xfrm_replay_advance_bmp:
>
> BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8af350ad7920
> #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
> #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
> PGD ad001067 P4D ad001067 PUD 0
> Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
> CPU: 3 PID: 30 Comm: ksoftirqd/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.4.52-050452-generic #202007160732
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
> RIP: 0010:xfrm_replay_advance_bmp+0xbb/0x130
> RSP: 0018:ffffa1304013ba40 EFLAGS: 00010206
> RAX: 000000000000010d RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000ffffff4b
> RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: 00000000004c234c RDI: 00000000ffb3dbff
> RBP: ffffa1304013ba50 R08: ffff8af330ad7920 R09: 0000000007fffffa
> R10: 0000000000000800 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: ffff8af29d6258c0
> R13: ffff8af28b95c700 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8af29d6258fc
> FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8af339ac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: ffff8af350ad7920 CR3: 0000000015ee4000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
> Call Trace:
> xfrm_input+0x4e5/0xa10
> xfrm4_rcv_encap+0xb5/0xe0
> xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv+0x140/0x1c0
>
> Analysis revealed offending code is when accessing:
>
> replay_esn->bmp[nr] |= (1U << bitnr);
>
> with 'nr' being 0x07fffffa.
>
> This happened in an SMP system when reordering of packets was present;
> A packet arrived with a "too old" sequence number (outside the window,
> i.e 'diff > replay_window'), and therefore the following calculation:
>
> bitnr = replay_esn->replay_window - (diff - pos);
>
> yields a negative result, but since bitnr is u32 we get a large unsigned
> quantity (in crash dump above: 0xffffff4b seen in ecx).
>
> This was supposed to be protected by xfrm_input()'s former call to:
>
> if (x->repl->check(x, skb, seq)) {
>
> However, the state's spinlock x->lock is *released* after '->check()'
> is performed, and gets re-acquired before '->advance()' - which gives a
> chance for a different core to update the xfrm state, e.g. by advancing
> 'replay_esn->seq' when it encounters more packets - leading to a
> 'diff > replay_window' situation when original core continues to
> xfrm_replay_advance_bmp().
>
> An attempt to fix this issue was suggested in commit bcf66bf54aab
> ("xfrm: Perform a replay check after return from async codepaths"),
> by calling 'x->repl->recheck()' after lock is re-acquired, but fix
> applied only to asyncronous crypto algorithms.
>
> Augment the fix, by *always* calling 'recheck()' - irrespective if we're
> using async crypto.
>
> Fixes: 0ebea8ef3559 ("[IPSEC]: Move state lock into x->type->input")
> Signed-off-by: Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@...il.com>
Applied, thanks a lot Shmulik!
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