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Message-ID: <20210121235007.vmq24fjyesrvjkqm@kafai-mbp>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 15:50:07 -0800
From: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>
To: <sdf@...gle.com>
CC: <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, <ast@...nel.org>,
<daniel@...earbox.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: verify that rebinding to
port < 1024 from BPF works
On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 02:57:44PM -0800, sdf@...gle.com wrote:
> On 01/21, Martin KaFai Lau wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 05:22:41PM -0800, Stanislav Fomichev wrote:
> > > BPF rewrites from 111 to 111, but it still should mark the port as
> > > "changed".
> > > We also verify that if port isn't touched by BPF, it's still prohibited.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>
> > > ---
> > > .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bind_perm.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++
> > > tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bind_perm.c | 36 ++++++++
> > > 2 files changed, 124 insertions(+)
> > > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bind_perm.c
> > > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bind_perm.c
> > >
> > > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bind_perm.c
> > b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bind_perm.c
> > > new file mode 100644
> > > index 000000000000..840a04ac9042
> > > --- /dev/null
> > > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bind_perm.c
> > > @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
> > > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > > +#include <test_progs.h>
> > > +#include "bind_perm.skel.h"
> > > +
> > > +#include <sys/types.h>
> > > +#include <sys/socket.h>
> > > +#include <sys/capability.h>
> > > +
> > > +static int duration;
> > > +
> > > +void try_bind(int port, int expected_errno)
> > > +{
> > > + struct sockaddr_in sin = {};
> > > + int fd = -1;
> > > +
> > > + fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
> > > + if (CHECK(fd < 0, "fd", "errno %d", errno))
> > > + goto close_socket;
> > > +
> > > + sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
> > > + sin.sin_port = htons(port);
> > > +
> > > + errno = 0;
> > > + bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
> > > + CHECK(errno != expected_errno, "bind", "errno %d, expected %d",
> > > + errno, expected_errno);
> > > +
> > > +close_socket:
> > > + if (fd >= 0)
> > > + close(fd);
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +void cap_net_bind_service(cap_flag_value_t flag)
> > > +{
> > > + const cap_value_t cap_net_bind_service = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE;
> > > + cap_t caps;
> > > +
> > > + caps = cap_get_proc();
> > > + if (CHECK(!caps, "cap_get_proc", "errno %d", errno))
> > > + goto free_caps;
> > > +
> > > + if (CHECK(cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &cap_net_bind_service,
> > > + CAP_CLEAR),
> > > + "cap_set_flag", "errno %d", errno))
> > > + goto free_caps;
> > > +
> > > + if (CHECK(cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &cap_net_bind_service,
> > > + CAP_CLEAR),
> > > + "cap_set_flag", "errno %d", errno))
> > > + goto free_caps;
> > > +
> > > + if (CHECK(cap_set_proc(caps), "cap_set_proc", "errno %d", errno))
> > > + goto free_caps;
> > > +
> > > +free_caps:
> > > + if (CHECK(cap_free(caps), "cap_free", "errno %d", errno))
> > > + goto free_caps;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +void test_bind_perm(void)
> > > +{
> > > + struct bind_perm *skel;
> > > + int cgroup_fd;
> > > +
> > > + cgroup_fd = test__join_cgroup("/bind_perm");
> > > + if (CHECK(cgroup_fd < 0, "cg-join", "errno %d", errno))
> > > + return;
> > > +
> > > + skel = bind_perm__open_and_load();
> > > + if (CHECK(!skel, "skel-load", "errno %d", errno))
> > > + goto close_cgroup_fd;
> > > +
> > > + skel->links.bind_v4_prog =
> > bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.bind_v4_prog, cgroup_fd);
> > > + if (CHECK(IS_ERR(skel->links.bind_v4_prog),
> > > + "cg-attach", "bind4 %ld",
> > > + PTR_ERR(skel->links.bind_v4_prog)))
> > > + goto close_skeleton;
> > > +
> > > + cap_net_bind_service(CAP_CLEAR);
> > > + try_bind(110, EACCES);
> > > + try_bind(111, 0);
> > > + cap_net_bind_service(CAP_SET);
> > > +
> > > +close_skeleton:
> > > + bind_perm__destroy(skel);
> > > +close_cgroup_fd:
> > > + close(cgroup_fd);
> > > +}
> > > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bind_perm.c
> > b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bind_perm.c
> > > new file mode 100644
> > > index 000000000000..2194587ec806
> > > --- /dev/null
> > > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bind_perm.c
> > > @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
> > > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > > +
> > > +#include <linux/stddef.h>
> > > +#include <linux/bpf.h>
> > > +#include <sys/types.h>
> > > +#include <sys/socket.h>
> > > +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
> > > +#include <bpf/bpf_endian.h>
> > > +
> > > +SEC("cgroup/bind4")
> > > +int bind_v4_prog(struct bpf_sock_addr *ctx)
> > > +{
> > > + struct bpf_sock *sk;
> > > + __u32 user_ip4;
> > > + __u16 user_port;
> > > +
> > > + sk = ctx->sk;
> > > + if (!sk)
> > > + return 0;
> > > +
> > > + if (sk->family != AF_INET)
> > > + return 0;
> > > +
> > > + if (ctx->type != SOCK_STREAM)
> > > + return 0;
> > > +
> > > + /* Rewriting to the same value should still cause
> > > + * permission check to be bypassed.
> > > + */
> > > + if (ctx->user_port == bpf_htons(111))
> > > + ctx->user_port = bpf_htons(111);
> > iiuc, this overwrite is essentially the way to ensure the bind
> > will succeed (override CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE in this particular case?).
> Correct. The alternative might be to export ignore_perm_check
> via bpf_sock_addr and make it explicit.
An explicit field is one option.
or a different return value (e.g. BPF_PROG_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS_RUN_ARRAY).
Not sure which one (including the one in the current patch) is better
at this point.
Also, from patch 1, if one cgrp bpf prog says no-perm-check,
it does not matter what the latter cgrp bpf progs have to say?
>
> > It seems to be okay if we consider most of the use cases is rewriting
> > to a different port.
>
> > However, it is quite un-intuitive to the bpf prog to overwrite with
> > the same user_port just to ensure this port can be binded successfully
> > later.
> I'm testing a corner case here when the address is rewritten to the same
> value, but the intention is to rewrite X to Y < 1024.
It is a legit corner case though.
Also, is it possible that the compiler may optimize this
same-value-assignment out?
>
> > Is user_port the only case? How about other fields in bpf_sock_addr?
> Good question. For our use case only the port matters because
> we rewrite both port and address (and never only address).
>
> It does feel like it should also work when BPF rewrites address only
> (and port happens to be in the privileged range). I guess I can
> apply the same logic to the user_ip4 and user_ip6?
My concern is having more cases that need to overwrite with the same value.
Then it may make a stronger case to use return value or an explicit field.
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