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Message-ID: <3c542e42-2033-aca6-ba0e-4854c24980c2@iogearbox.net>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2021 23:27:22 +0100
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
To: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@...hat.com>
Cc: bpf@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Daniel Borkmann <borkmann@...earbox.net>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
maze@...gle.com, lmb@...udflare.com, shaun@...era.io,
Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@...nel.org>, marek@...udflare.com,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, eyal.birger@...il.com,
colrack@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next V12 4/7] bpf: add BPF-helper for MTU checking
On 1/25/21 9:41 AM, Jesper Dangaard Brouer wrote:
> On Sat, 23 Jan 2021 02:35:41 +0100
> Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net> wrote:
>
>>> + * The *flags* argument can be a combination of one or more of the
>>> + * following values:
>>> + *
>>> + * **BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS**
>>> + * This flag will only works for *ctx* **struct sk_buff**.
>>> + * If packet context contains extra packet segment buffers
>>> + * (often knows as GSO skb), then MTU check is harder to
>>> + * check at this point, because in transmit path it is
>>> + * possible for the skb packet to get re-segmented
>>> + * (depending on net device features). This could still be
>>> + * a MTU violation, so this flag enables performing MTU
>>> + * check against segments, with a different violation
>>> + * return code to tell it apart. Check cannot use len_diff.
>>> + *
>>> + * On return *mtu_len* pointer contains the MTU value of the net
>>> + * device. Remember the net device configured MTU is the L3 size,
>>> + * which is returned here and XDP and TX length operate at L2.
>>> + * Helper take this into account for you, but remember when using
>>> + * MTU value in your BPF-code. On input *mtu_len* must be a valid
>>> + * pointer and be initialized (to zero), else verifier will reject
>>> + * BPF program.
>>> + *
>>> + * Return
>>> + * * 0 on success, and populate MTU value in *mtu_len* pointer.
>>> + *
>>> + * * < 0 if any input argument is invalid (*mtu_len* not updated)
>>> + *
>>> + * MTU violations return positive values, but also populate MTU
>>> + * value in *mtu_len* pointer, as this can be needed for
>>> + * implementing PMTU handing:
>>> + *
>>> + * * **BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_FRAG_NEEDED**
>>> + * * **BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SEGS_TOOBIG**
>>> + *
>>> */
>> [...]
>>> +BPF_CALL_5(bpf_skb_check_mtu, struct sk_buff *, skb,
>>> + u32, ifindex, u32 *, mtu_len, s32, len_diff, u64, flags)
>>> +{
>>> + int ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_FRAG_NEEDED;
>>> + struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
>>> + int skb_len, dev_len;
>>> + int mtu;
>>> +
>>> + if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS)))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> + dev = __dev_via_ifindex(dev, ifindex);
>>> + if (unlikely(!dev))
>>> + return -ENODEV;
>>> +
>>> + mtu = READ_ONCE(dev->mtu);
>>> +
>>> + dev_len = mtu + dev->hard_header_len;
>>> + skb_len = skb->len + len_diff; /* minus result pass check */
>>> + if (skb_len <= dev_len) {
>>> + ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SUCCESS;
>>> + goto out;
>>> + }
>>> + /* At this point, skb->len exceed MTU, but as it include length of all
>>> + * segments, it can still be below MTU. The SKB can possibly get
>>> + * re-segmented in transmit path (see validate_xmit_skb). Thus, user
>>> + * must choose if segs are to be MTU checked.
>>> + */
>>> + if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
>>> + ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SUCCESS;
>>> +
>>> + if (flags & BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS &&
>>> + !skb_gso_validate_network_len(skb, mtu))
>>> + ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SEGS_TOOBIG;
>>
>> I think that looks okay overall now. One thing that will easily slip through
>> is that in the helper description you mentioned 'Check cannot use len_diff.'
>> for BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS flag. So right now for non-zero len_diff the user
>> will still get BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SUCCESS if the current length check via
>> skb_gso_validate_network_len(skb, mtu) passes. If it cannot be checked,
>> maybe enforce len_diff == 0 for gso skbs on BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS?
>
> Ok. Do you want/think this can be enforced by the verifier or are you
> simply requesting that the helper will return -EINVAL (or another errno)?
Simple -EINVAL should be fine in this case. Generally, we can detect this from
verifier side but I don't think the extra complexity is worth it especially given
this is dependent on BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS and otherwise can be non-zero.
Thanks,
Daniel
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