lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Wed, 3 Feb 2021 17:34:24 -0800
From:   Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@...el.com>
To:     Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
Cc:     Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@...el.com>, davem@...emloft.net,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, sassmann@...hat.com,
        Tony Brelinski <tonyx.brelinski@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 04/15] ice: add devlink parameters to read and
 write minimum security revision



On 2/3/2021 12:41 PM, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> On Thu, 28 Jan 2021 16:43:21 -0800 Tony Nguyen wrote:
>> From: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@...el.com>
>>
>> The ice NVM flash has a security revision field for the main NVM bank
>> and the Option ROM bank. In addition to the revision within the module,
>> the device also has a minimum security revision TLV area. This minimum
>> security revision field indicates the minimum value that will be
>> accepted for the associated security revision when loading the NVM bank.
>>
>> Add functions to read and update the minimum security revisions. Use
>> these functions to implement devlink parameters, "fw.undi.minsrev" and
>> "fw.mgmt.minsrev".
>>
>> These parameters are permanent (i.e. stored in flash), and are used to
>> indicate the minimum security revision of the associated NVM bank. If
>> the image in the bank has a lower security revision, then the flash
>> loader will not continue loading that flash bank.
>>
>> The new parameters allow for opting in to update the minimum security
>> revision to ensure that a flash image with a known security flaw cannot
>> be loaded.
>>
>> Note that the minimum security revision cannot be reduced, only
>> increased. The driver also refuses to allow an update if the currently
>> active image revision is lower than the requested value. This is done to
>> avoid potentially updating the value such that the device can no longer
>> start.

Hi Jakub,

> 
> Hi Jake, I had a couple of conversations with people from operations
> and I'm struggling to find interest in writing this parameter. 
>> It seems like the expectation is that the min sec revision will go up
> automatically after a new firmware with a higher number is flashed.
> 

I believe the intention is that the update is not automatic, and
requires the user to opt-in to enforcing the new minimum value. This is
because once you update this value it is not possible to lower it
without physical access to reflash the chip directly. It's intended as a
mechanism to allow a system administrator to ensure that the board is
unable to downgrade below a given minimum security revision.

> Do you have a user scenario where the manual bumping is needed?
> 

In our case, we have tools which would use this interface and would
perform the update upon request i.e. because the tool is configured to
perform the update.

We don't want this field to be updated every time the board is flashed,
as it is supposed to be an optional "opt-in", and not forced.

The flow is something like:

a) device is as firmware version with SREV of 1
b) new firmware is flashed with SREV 2
c) system administrator confirms that new firmware is working and that
no issues have occurred
d) system administrator then decides to enforce new srev by updating the
minimum srev value.

If there was an issue at step (c), we want to still be able to roll back
to the old firmware. If the minimum srev is updated automatically, this
would not be possible.

I've asked for further details from some of our firmware folks, and can
try to provide further information. The key is that making it automatic
is bad because it prevents rollback, so we want to ensure that it is
only updated after the system administrator is ready to opt-in.

Ofcourse, it is plausible that most won't actually update this ever,
because preventing the ability to use an old firmware might not be desired.

The goal with this series was to provide a mechanism to allow the
update, because existing tools based on direct flash access have support
for this, and we want to ensure that these tools can be ported to
devlink without the direct flash access that we were (ab)using before.

Thanks,
Jake

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ