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Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 14:02:15 +0800
From: Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
Cc: Si-Wei Liu <si-wei.liu@...cle.com>, elic@...dia.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] vdpa/mlx5: set_features should allow reset to zero
On 2021/2/24 1:17 下午, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 24, 2021 at 11:20:01AM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
>> On 2021/2/24 3:35 上午, Si-Wei Liu wrote:
>>>
>>> On 2/23/2021 5:26 AM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Feb 23, 2021 at 10:03:57AM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
>>>>> On 2021/2/23 9:12 上午, Si-Wei Liu wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/21/2021 11:34 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
>>>>>>> On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 12:14:17PM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2021/2/19 7:54 下午, Si-Wei Liu wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Commit 452639a64ad8 ("vdpa: make sure set_features is invoked
>>>>>>>>> for legacy") made an exception for legacy guests to reset
>>>>>>>>> features to 0, when config space is accessed before features
>>>>>>>>> are set. We should relieve the verify_min_features() check
>>>>>>>>> and allow features reset to 0 for this case.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It's worth noting that not just legacy guests could access
>>>>>>>>> config space before features are set. For instance, when
>>>>>>>>> feature VIRTIO_NET_F_MTU is advertised some modern driver
>>>>>>>>> will try to access and validate the MTU present in the config
>>>>>>>>> space before virtio features are set.
>>>>>>>> This looks like a spec violation:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The following driver-read-only field, mtu only exists if
>>>>>>>> VIRTIO_NET_F_MTU is
>>>>>>>> set.
>>>>>>>> This field specifies the maximum MTU for the driver to use.
>>>>>>>> "
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Do we really want to workaround this?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thanks
>>>>>>> And also:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The driver MUST follow this sequence to initialize a device:
>>>>>>> 1. Reset the device.
>>>>>>> 2. Set the ACKNOWLEDGE status bit: the guest OS has
>>>>>>> noticed the device.
>>>>>>> 3. Set the DRIVER status bit: the guest OS knows how to drive the
>>>>>>> device.
>>>>>>> 4. Read device feature bits, and write the subset of feature bits
>>>>>>> understood by the OS and driver to the
>>>>>>> device. During this step the driver MAY read (but MUST NOT write)
>>>>>>> the device-specific configuration
>>>>>>> fields to check that it can support the device before accepting it.
>>>>>>> 5. Set the FEATURES_OK status bit. The driver MUST NOT accept new
>>>>>>> feature bits after this step.
>>>>>>> 6. Re-read device status to ensure the FEATURES_OK bit is still set:
>>>>>>> otherwise, the device does not
>>>>>>> support our subset of features and the device is unusable.
>>>>>>> 7. Perform device-specific setup, including discovery of virtqueues
>>>>>>> for the device, optional per-bus setup,
>>>>>>> reading and possibly writing the device’s virtio configuration
>>>>>>> space, and population of virtqueues.
>>>>>>> 8. Set the DRIVER_OK status bit. At this point the device is “live”.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> so accessing config space before FEATURES_OK is a spec
>>>>>>> violation, right?
>>>>>> It is, but it's not relevant to what this commit tries to address. I
>>>>>> thought the legacy guest still needs to be supported.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Having said, a separate patch has to be posted to fix the guest driver
>>>>>> issue where this discrepancy is introduced to
>>>>>> virtnet_validate() (since
>>>>>> commit fe36cbe067). But it's not technically related to this patch.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -Siwei
>>>>> I think it's a bug to read config space in validate, we should
>>>>> move it to
>>>>> virtnet_probe().
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks
>>>> I take it back, reading but not writing seems to be explicitly
>>>> allowed by spec.
>>>> So our way to detect a legacy guest is bogus, need to think what is
>>>> the best way to handle this.
>>> Then maybe revert commit fe36cbe067 and friends, and have QEMU detect
>>> legacy guest? Supposedly only config space write access needs to be
>>> guarded before setting FEATURES_OK.
>>
>> I agree. My understanding is that all vDPA must be modern device (since
>> VIRITO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is mandated) instead of transitional device.
>>
>> Thanks
> Well mlx5 has some code to handle legacy guests ...
My understanding is that, even if mlx5 is modern device it can still
suppot legacy guests since the device saw by guest is emulated by Qemu.
Qemu can just present a transitional device to guest, but negotiate
VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM. (Actually this is what has been done now).
Thanks
> Eli, could you comment? Is that support unused right now?
>
>
>>> -Siwie
>>>
>>>>>>>>> Rejecting reset to 0
>>>>>>>>> prematurely causes correct MTU and link status unable to load
>>>>>>>>> for the very first config space access, rendering issues like
>>>>>>>>> guest showing inaccurate MTU value, or failure to reject
>>>>>>>>> out-of-range MTU.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Fixes: 1a86b377aa21 ("vdpa/mlx5: Add VDPA driver for
>>>>>>>>> supported mlx5 devices")
>>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Si-Wei Liu <si-wei.liu@...cle.com>
>>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>>> drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c | 15 +--------------
>>>>>>>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 14 deletions(-)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> diff --git a/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c
>>>>>>>>> b/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c
>>>>>>>>> index 7c1f789..540dd67 100644
>>>>>>>>> --- a/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c
>>>>>>>>> +++ b/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c
>>>>>>>>> @@ -1490,14 +1490,6 @@ static u64
>>>>>>>>> mlx5_vdpa_get_features(struct vdpa_device *vdev)
>>>>>>>>> return mvdev->mlx_features;
>>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>>> -static int verify_min_features(struct mlx5_vdpa_dev *mvdev,
>>>>>>>>> u64 features)
>>>>>>>>> -{
>>>>>>>>> - if (!(features & BIT_ULL(VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM)))
>>>>>>>>> - return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>> - return 0;
>>>>>>>>> -}
>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>> static int setup_virtqueues(struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev)
>>>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>>>> int err;
>>>>>>>>> @@ -1558,18 +1550,13 @@ static int
>>>>>>>>> mlx5_vdpa_set_features(struct vdpa_device *vdev, u64
>>>>>>>>> features)
>>>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>>>> struct mlx5_vdpa_dev *mvdev = to_mvdev(vdev);
>>>>>>>>> struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev = to_mlx5_vdpa_ndev(mvdev);
>>>>>>>>> - int err;
>>>>>>>>> print_features(mvdev, features, true);
>>>>>>>>> - err = verify_min_features(mvdev, features);
>>>>>>>>> - if (err)
>>>>>>>>> - return err;
>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>> ndev->mvdev.actual_features = features &
>>>>>>>>> ndev->mvdev.mlx_features;
>>>>>>>>> ndev->config.mtu = cpu_to_mlx5vdpa16(mvdev, ndev->mtu);
>>>>>>>>> ndev->config.status |= cpu_to_mlx5vdpa16(mvdev,
>>>>>>>>> VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP);
>>>>>>>>> - return err;
>>>>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>>> static void mlx5_vdpa_set_config_cb(struct vdpa_device
>>>>>>>>> *vdev, struct vdpa_callback *cb)
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