netdev - Re: [PATCH 0/8] xen: harden frontends against malicious backends

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Message-ID: <YKeOtbXkFz7JTMn0@mail-itl>
Date:   Fri, 21 May 2021 12:43:00 +0200
From:   Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 
        <marmarek@...isiblethingslab.com>
To:     Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
Cc:     xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-block@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@...rix.com>,
        Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/8] xen: harden frontends against malicious backends

On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 12:02:54PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0
> user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might
> reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so
> a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still
> mess up I/O data, but it shouldn't be able to e.g. crash a guest by
> other means or cause a privilege escalation in the guest).
> 
> Unfortunately many frontends in the Linux kernel are fully trusting
> their respective backends. This series is starting to fix the most
> important frontends: console, disk and network.
> 
> It was discussed to handle this as a security problem, but the topic
> was discussed in public before, so it isn't a real secret.

Is it based on patches we ship in Qubes[1] and also I've sent here some
years ago[2]? I see a lot of similarities. If not, you may want to
compare them.

[1] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-kernel/
[2] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-04/msg02336.html


> Juergen Gross (8):
>   xen: sync include/xen/interface/io/ring.h with Xen's newest version
>   xen/blkfront: read response from backend only once
>   xen/blkfront: don't take local copy of a request from the ring page
>   xen/blkfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
>   xen/netfront: read response from backend only once
>   xen/netfront: don't read data from request on the ring page
>   xen/netfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
>   xen/hvc: replace BUG_ON() with negative return value
> 
>  drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c    | 118 +++++++++-----
>  drivers/net/xen-netfront.c      | 184 ++++++++++++++-------
>  drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c       |  15 +-
>  include/xen/interface/io/ring.h | 278 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
>  4 files changed, 369 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-)
> 
> -- 
> 2.26.2
> 
> 

-- 
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab

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