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Message-Id: <20210603170734.3168284-8-sashal@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 2021 13:06:58 -0400
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Jeimon <jjjinmeng.zhou@...il.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>, linux-nfc@...ts.01.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.12 08/43] net/nfc/rawsock.c: fix a permission check bug
From: Jeimon <jjjinmeng.zhou@...il.com>
[ Upstream commit 8ab78863e9eff11910e1ac8bcf478060c29b379e ]
The function rawsock_create() calls a privileged function sk_alloc(), which requires a ns-aware check to check net->user_ns, i.e., ns_capable(). However, the original code checks the init_user_ns using capable(). So we replace the capable() with ns_capable().
Signed-off-by: Jeimon <jjjinmeng.zhou@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
net/nfc/rawsock.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/nfc/rawsock.c b/net/nfc/rawsock.c
index 9c7eb8455ba8..5f1d438a0a23 100644
--- a/net/nfc/rawsock.c
+++ b/net/nfc/rawsock.c
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static int rawsock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW) {
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
return -EPERM;
sock->ops = &rawsock_raw_ops;
} else {
--
2.30.2
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